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Sanctions for Frivolous Civil Appeals in Louisiana 
Gail S. Stephenson* 
“[T]he courts are too busy, and the cost of litigation is too 
high, to play games through appellate procedure . . . .”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Frivolous appeals burden overcrowded courts, diminish the 
opportunity for careful consideration of nonfrivolous appeals, and 
delay access for litigants with meritorious claims.2 Rules sanctioning 
frivolous appeals can deter unnecessary appeals,3 preserve the courts’ 
time and resources,4 and leave more time for meritorious appeals.5  
Appeals are favored in Louisiana,6 and courts are loath to 
punish appellants for fear of chilling the appellate process.7 Still, 
frivolous appellants, like pro se litigants, should have “neither an 
impenetrable shield nor a license to harass others, clog the judicial 
machinery with meritless [appeals], or abuse already overloaded 
court dockets.”8 
Louisiana judges possess authority under Louisiana Code of 
Civil Procedure article 2164 to “curb apparent abuses of process by 
imposing sanctions . . . for frivolous appeals.”9 Article 2164, 
enacted in 1960 and effective January 1, 1961, gives Louisiana 
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 1. Schnatz v. Schnatz, 501 So. 2d 318, 320 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 
 2. Asberry v. U.S. Postal Serv., 692 F.2d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1982). 
 3. See State ex rel. Muse v. Ross, 651 So. 2d 364, 366 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
 4. Kurt M. Saunders, Plying the Erie Waters: Choice of Law in the 
Deterrence of Frivolous Appeals, 21 GA. L. REV. 653, 682 (1987). 
 5. Michael S. Oberman, Coping with Rising Caseload II: Defining the 
Frivolous Civil Appeal, 47 BROOK. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1981). 
 6. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bridges, 144 So. 3d 1001, 1010 (La. 2013); Kite 
Bros., LLC v. Kite RV, LLC, 150 So. 3d 608, 609 (La. Ct. App. 2014). 
 7.   See Doe v. Jo Ellen Smith Med. Found., 115 So. 3d 655, 665 (La. Ct. 
App. 2013); Vincent v. Vincent, 95 So. 3d 1152, 1160 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
 8. Bankston v. Alexandria Neurosurgical Clinic, 659 So. 2d 507, 511 (La. 
Ct. App. 1994). 
 9. Borel v. Borel, 624 So. 2d 1279, 1284 (La. Ct. App. 1993). See also LA. 
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2164 (2015).  
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courts broad discretion to sanction frivolous civil appeals.10 It 
provides: 
The appellate court shall render any judgment which is just, 
legal, and proper upon the record on appeal. The court may 
award damages, including attorney fees, for frivolous appeal 
or application for writs, and may tax the costs of the lower or 
appellate court, or any part thereof, against any party to the 
suit, as in its judgment may be considered equitable.11 
Despite this broad discretion, during the past 30 years, frivolous-
appeal sanctions have been imposed in less than 10% of the cases 
in which sanctions were sought.12 
This Article reviews the jurisprudence from 1985 to 2015 
applying article 216413 and examines the standard applied by 
Louisiana courts, the circumstances under which frivolous-appeal 
sanctions will be awarded, the procedural issues attorneys encounter, 
the types of sanctions awarded, the treatment of pro se litigants, and 
the ethical issues that arise. It concludes with recommendations for 
action by the courts and the Louisiana Legislature that could 
ultimately reduce the number of frivolous appeals. 
II. LOUISIANA’S STANDARD FOR IMPOSING 
FRIVOLOUS-APPEAL SANCTIONS 
Four years after its effective date, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
rendered a decision interpreting article 2164 and severely limiting 
its application. In Parker v. Interstate Life & Accident Insurance 
Co.,14 the court set forth an extremely subjective test, permitting 
sanctions for frivolous appeals only when “it is obvious that the 
appeal was taken solely for delay or that counsel is not sincere in 
                                                                                                             
 10. Act No. 15, 1960 La. Acts 22. 
 11. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2164 (2015). 
 12. Sanctions were imposed in 83 of 834 cases between 1985 and 2015. 
These figures are based on a chart compiled by the author listing the history, 
result, and reasoning from every civil case that sought frivolous-appeal 
sanctions between 1985 and 2015. The chart is on file with the author. The 
author conducted a Westlaw search using the terms “frivolous /s appeal % 
Anders & da(aft 1984).” Anders was excluded from the search terms to filter 
criminal frivolous appeals, as this Article discusses only civil appeals. Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), is the fountainhead case on frivolous criminal 
appeals. 
 13. This author reviewed the jurisprudence applying article 2164 from its 
effective date in 1961 through 1984 in an earlier work. See Gail Sweeney 
Stephenson, Comment, Damages for Frivolous Appeal, 45 LA. L. REV. 137 
(1984). 
 14. 179 So. 2d 634 (La. 1965). 
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the view of the law he advocates even though the court is of the 
opinion that such view is not meritorious.”15 The court explained 
that if the appellant’s counsel “proclaim[ed] his sincerity,” the 
court could not “disbelieve [it] unless, and only unless, the 
proposition advocated is so ridiculous or so opposed to rational 
thinking that it is evident beyond any doubt that it is being 
deliberately professed for ulterior purposes.”16 
This author decried the Parker test 30 years ago as “tip[ping] the 
balance too far in favor of the appellant” and suggested that the 
Legislature amend the article to set forth a more objective 
standard.17 The only legislative change in the last 54 years, however, 
has been an amendment in 2010 to specify that attorney fees can be 
included as damages and to make the article applicable to writ 
applications.18 
The Louisiana Supreme Court has been as disinclined as the 
Legislature to make changes. In the 50 years since Parker, the 
Supreme Court has ruled on only six cases involving frivolous-
appeal sanctions—Hampton v. Greenfield, its only full opinion,19 
and five memorandum opinions. In Hampton, the court simply 
reiterated the Parker standard.20 In four of the memorandum 
opinions, it summarily reversed awards of sanctions.21 In the fifth, 
it summarily remanded the case to the court of appeal “to award 
damages and attorney fees for a frivolous appeal.”22  
The intermediate appellate court found that the appeal in 
Hampton was sanctionable because the appellant’s arguments were 
“identical to those already adjudicated” and simply ignored the 
court’s prior holding.23 The Supreme Court reversed.24 The court 
began its analysis of the frivolous-appeal argument by repeating 
language Louisiana courts had used for 80 years: “Appeals are 
always favored and, unless the appeal is unquestionably frivolous, 
                                                                                                             
 15. Id. at 636. 
 16. Id. at 637. 
 17. Stephenson, supra note 13, at 147. 
 18. Act No. 184, 2010 La. Acts 1391. 
 19. Hampton v. Greenfield, 618 So. 2d 859, 863–64 (La. 1993).  
 20. Id. at 863. 
 21. Landry v. Broussard, 108 So. 3d 760 (La. 2013); Cajun Contractors, Inc. 
v. Lafayette Consol. Gov’t, 723 So. 2d 968 (La. 1998); G.B.M., Inc. v. Juna 
Corp., 614 So. 2d 1249 (La. 1993); Arnoult v. Arnoult, 498 So. 2d 749 (La. 
1986). 
 22. Bouzon v. Bouzon, 532 So. 2d 1386, 1387 (La. 1988) (remanding case 
to appellate court). 
 23. Hampton v. Greenfield, 602 So. 2d 327, 329 (La. Ct. App. 1992), aff’d 
in part & rev’d in part, 618 So. 2d 859 (La. 1993). 
 24. Hampton, 618 So. 2d at 864.  
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damages will not be allowed.”25 It then quoted the Parker 
standard: An appeal is frivolous only if “it is obvious that the 
appeal was taken solely for delay or that counsel is not sincere in 
the view of the law he advocates even though the court is of the 
opinion that such view is not meritorious.”26 The court stated the 
appeal did not fall into the first category, delay, because “nothing 
in the record suggest[ed] that the appeal was filed solely for 
delay.”27  
To determine whether the appeal fell into the second category, 
insincerity, the court again relied on Parker, stating that when 
“counsel proclaims his sincerity, a court finds itself without just 
cause to disbelieve unless, and only unless, the proposition 
advocated is so ridiculous or so opposed to rational thinking that it 
is evident beyond any doubt that it is being deliberately professed 
for ulterior purposes.”28 The court found the appeal was not 
insincere because the appellant “sincerely advocated its legal 
arguments on appeal” and stated in its brief that it was “acting in 
‘good faith.’”29 The court further stated that the appellant “raised 
legitimate issues,” leading the court to believe that “the appeal was 
not taken for ulterior purposes.”30 
Justice Revius Ortique vehemently dissented from the 
application of Parker’s sincerity standard, asserting that “[a]ny 
attorney schooled in the art of advocacy may interpose sincerity in 
the position he advocates on appeal, under threat of the imposition 
of damages against him or his client.”31 
As the Louisiana Supreme Court has been steadfast in applying 
an extremely subjective standard, appellate courts tend to give 
short shrift to requests for sanctions. In addition to the language of 
Parker and Hampton, courts tend to use the following boilerplate 
statements when denying sanctions: 
  This provision is penal in nature and must be strictly 
construed.32 
 
                                                                                                             
 25. Id. at 862 (citing City of Shreveport v. U.S.F. & G. Co., 60 So. 621, 622 
(La. 1913)). 
 26. Id. (quoting Parker v. Interstate Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 179 So. 2d 634, 
636–37 (La. 1965)). 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. at 863 (quoting Parker, 179 So. 2d at 637). 
 29. Id. at 863.  
 30. Id. at 864. 
 31. Id. at 866 (Ortique, J., dissenting). 
 32. See, e.g., Reasonover v. Lastrapes, 40 So. 3d 303, 310 (La. Ct. App. 
2010); Davis v. Davis, 997 So. 2d 149, 159 (La. Ct. App. 2008). 
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 Penalties for frivolous appeal will not be imposed unless 
clearly due.33 
  Penalties for frivolous appeal will not be imposed unless 
the appeal is “unquestionably frivolous.”34 
  The slightest justification precludes frivolous-appeal 
damages.35 
  Lack of merit does not necessarily mean an appeal is 
frivolous.36 
  Sanctions will be awarded only in “rare” cases.37 
  Courts do not want to “chill” the appellate process.38 
  Courts are very reluctant to grant frivolous-appeal 
damages.39 
Some courts go beyond the boilerplate. Some ask whether the 
appeal “present[s] a substantial legal question,”40 and some look 
for bad faith of the appellant.41 One court even required a finding 
                                                                                                             
 33. See, e.g., Walker v. Smith, No. 2010-CA-0721, 2010 WL 4273091, at 
*12 (La. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2010); Rivera v. Blossom, 872 So. 2d 541, 544 (La. 
Ct. App. 2004). 
 34. See, e.g., Akers v. Bernhard Mech. Contractors, Inc., 137 So. 3d 818, 
831 (La. Ct. App. 2014); Franklin v. Enter. Rent-A-Car, 104 So. 3d 720, 725 
(La. Ct. App. 2012); Mott v. Brister’s Thunder Karts, Inc., 663 So. 2d 233, 236 
(La. Ct. App. 1995). 
 35. See, e.g., Courtney v. Fletcher Trucking, 111 So. 3d 411, 419 (La. Ct. 
App. 2012); Dukes v. Sherwood Acres Apartments, 898 So. 2d 416, 418 (La. Ct. 
App. 2004). 
 36. See, e.g., Franklin, 104 So. 3d at 725; Hershell Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund 
Ins. Co., 743 So. 2d 698, 707 (La. Ct. App. 1999). 
 37. See, e.g., Flemings v. State, 19 So. 3d 1220, 1233 (La. Ct. App. 2009); 
Yarnell Ice Cream Co. v. Allen, 867 So. 2d 969, 973 (La. Ct. App. 2004).  
 38. See, e.g., Haney v. Davis, 925 So. 2d 591, 598 (La. Ct. App. 2006); 
Alden v. Lorning, 904 So. 2d 24, 30–31 (La. Ct. App. 2005). 
 39. See, e.g., Billiot v. Big Wheels Travel Ctr., No. 2010-CA-1503, 2011 
WL 1103034, at *3 (La. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2011); Bracken v. Payne & Keller 
Co., 970 So. 2d 582, 591–92 (La. Ct. App. 2007). 
 40. Blackledge v. Sol’s Pipe & Steel, Inc., 59 So. 3d 564, 568 (La. Ct. App. 
2011). See also Schnatz v. Schnatz, 501 So. 2d 318, 320 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 
 41. See, e.g., Warren v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ. & Agric. & 
Mech. Coll., No. 2014-CA-0310, 2014 WL 6492186, at *7 (La. Ct. App. Nov. 
20, 2014); Daisey v. Time Warner, 761 So. 2d 564, 569 (La. Ct. App. 1999). 
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of bad faith, stating that “implicit in those few cases finding 
appeals to be frivolous is an element of bad faith.”42  
An example of just how reluctant courts are to penalize frivolous 
appeals is Hicks v. Hicks, in which the appellee sought sanctions 
against a party who appealed a consent judgment that specifically 
incorporated an agreement by the parties not to appeal.43 The court 
dismissed the appeal, but with no analysis whatsoever, the court 
found that the appeal was not frivolous.44 Another court expressed 
what seems to be the prevailing attitude after reciting the boilerplate 
that lack of merit does not equal frivolity and that damages should 
be awarded when appeals are taken solely for delay.45 In denying 
sanctions, the court stated: “We note that all appeals result in delay 
and that many appeals lack merit. Such is obviously the case here. 
However, we find that this appeal is not frivolous.”46 
When courts go beyond the boilerplate and analyze whether 
sanctions are due, they look at the “nature of the appeal itself rather 
than to the actions of the appellant” giving rise to the suit.47 Among 
the considerations are the quality of the appellant’s brief and his oral 
argument. A sincere appeal is one where the appellant files a 
“quality” brief,48 with citations of authority49 and “serious and 
thought-provoking arguments”50 in the “spirit of zealous advocacy.”51 
The appellant then demonstrates that his appeal is sincere by 
appearing at oral argument52 and seriously arguing his position.53 The 
court also considers whether an argument is res nova54 as well as the 
                                                                                                             
 42. Haney v. Davis, 925 So. 2d 591, 598 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 
 43. Hicks v. Hicks, 561 So. 2d 188, 188 (La. Ct. App. 1990).  
 44. Id.  
 45. LePrettre v. Progressive Land Corp., 820 So. 2d 1240, 1247 (La. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
 46. Id.  
 47. Jordan v. City of Baton Rouge, 652 So. 2d 701, 705–06 (La. Ct. App. 
1995); Guy v. Madison Parish Sch. Bd., 579 So. 2d 1108, 1113 (La. Ct. App. 
1991). 
 48. Guy, 579 So. 2d at 1113. See also Vernon v. Vernon, 624 So. 2d 1295, 
1299 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (noting appellant’s position was “briefed extensively”). 
 49. Dear v. Mabile, 637 So. 2d 745, 748 (La. Ct. App. 1994). 
 50. Harvey v. Ouachita Parish Sch. Bd., 545 So. 2d 1241, 1245 (La. Ct. 
App. 1989).  
 51. City of Baton Rouge v. Douglas, 984 So. 2d 746, 750 (La. Ct. App. 
2008).  
 52. See Dear, 637 So. 2d at 748.  
 53. See Guillot v. Union Bank, 617 So. 2d 1343, 1347 (La. Ct. App. 1993). 
 54. Boudreau v. Boudreau, 563 So. 2d 1244, 1246 (La. Ct. App. 1990). See 
also Johnson & Placke v. Norris, 571 So. 2d 702, 707 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (first 
reported case on the presented issue). 
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amount of available jurisprudence;55 it will not consider an appeal 
frivolous if the argument is “innovative.”56 Courts do not require 
all of these characteristics, however; any one of these is usually 
sufficient to defeat a request for frivolous-appeal sanctions. 
A primary reason asserted for the courts’ reluctance to impose 
sanctions is a fear of chilling the appellate process. This fear 
justifies denying sanctions when the appellant puts forth novel or 
creative arguments. As Justice Ortique stated in his Hampton 
dissent: “Imaginative and creative lawyering has been and must be 
encouraged. The genius of a lawyer in a free society, must not be 
curtailed or stilted.”57 The difficulty is distinguishing between a 
sincerely creative lawyer who is trying to convince the court to 
change its interpretation of the law and one who is creatively 
abusing the judicial process.  
III. WHEN FRIVOLOUS-APPEAL SANCTIONS WILL BE AWARDED 
Even though courts are reluctant to award sanctions and the 
standard is high, sanctions were awarded in a total of 83 cases in 
the last 30 years, including eight cases involving pro se appellants. 
Those cases, the collective antithesis of the sincere appeals 
described above, fall into four broad categories: (1) appeals filed to 
gain a benefit from delay; (2) harassment appeals; (3) repetitive 
filings; and (4) cases with no serious issue either at trial or on 
appeal, usually characterized by bad or nonexistent briefs and a 
paucity of evidence introduced at trial. 
A. Solely for Delay 
Appeals sanctioned as taken solely for delay are those where 
the appellant has something to gain by the delay. In eviction suits, 
appellants have sought delays in order to avoid being removed 
from possession of property.58 In divorce suits involving alimony 
pending litigation, as explained in Part VI.A, infra, spouses have 
                                                                                                             
 55. See Jessen v. Dr. Kenneth W. Wimberly, D.D.S., 610 So. 2d 252, 258 
(La. Ct. App. 1992) (holding appeal was not frivolous “given the scant 
jurisprudence available”).  
 56. See Stroud v. Morrison Nursery, 899 So. 2d 840, 844 (La. Ct. App. 
2005).  
 57. Hampton v. Greenfield, 618 So. 2d 859, 866 (La. 1993) (Ortique, J., 
dissenting). 
 58. See, e.g., Wilson v. Fuqua, 553 So. 2d 926, 928 (La. Ct. App. 1989); La. 
Home Builders, Inc. v. Fontenot, 546 So. 2d 325, 328 (La. Ct. App. 1989); 
Arnona v. Arnona, 497 So. 2d 9, 10 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Dixie Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n v. Neal, 491 So. 2d 708, 709 (La. Ct. App. 1986). 
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appealed so that alimony payments would continue and, in some 
cases, so they could continue living in the family home.59 In suits 
with money judgments, some appellants simply sought to “delay 
the inevitable result” of having to pay the judgment.60 
The flip side of the divorce case in which a spouse seeks to 
keep alimony flowing is the appeal to delay paying alimony, a 
community-property settlement,61 or child support.62 Those cases 
usually contain elements of harassment and bad faith. 
B. Harassment Appeals 
When an appeal is filed primarily to harass the opponent and 
becomes “a predatory instrument rather than a method of resolving 
honest disputes,”63 the courts are more likely to impose sanctions. 
The most infamous series of harassment appeals arose in a family-
law context. Mr. Hester, an attorney, and his wife separated in 
1988 and divorced in 1992; his wife was awarded alimony and 
support for their three children,64 including one child who was 
severely disabled.65 Between 1989 and 2004, Mr. Hester filed 
innumerable lawsuits, motions, writs, and appeals in an attempt to 
avoid paying alimony and child support.66 Mrs. Hester was denied 
sanctions on two of Mr. Hester’s early appeals because she failed 
to file an answer or cross-appeal, even though the court found his 
appeals to be frivolous.67 She was, however, awarded sanctions 
                                                                                                             
 59. See, e.g., Lupberger v. Lupberger, 805 So. 2d 264, 275 (La. Ct. App. 
2001); Bouzon v. Bouzon, 537 So. 2d 822, 823 (La. Ct. App. 1989); Roland v. 
Roland, 519 So. 2d 1177, 1180 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 
 60. Politz v. Randy Key Constr., Inc., 836 So. 2d 168, 172 (La. Ct. App. 
2002). Defendants in Louisiana are discouraged from appealing to delay paying 
the judgment, however, by Louisiana’s relatively high judicial interest rate. See 
Judicial Interest Rates Through 2015, 62 LA. B.J. 251, 253 (2015) (listing 
judicial interest rates from 1980 through 2015). 
 61. See McDonald v. McDonald, 10 So. 3d 780, 784 (La. Ct. App. 2009). 
 62. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 986 So. 2d 797, 802 (La. Ct. App. 2008) 
(husband refused to pay private-school tuition agreed upon in a consent 
judgment); Hester v. Hester (Hester IV), 752 So. 2d 269, 273 (La. Ct. App. 
2000) (multiple suits and appeals to avoid child support and alimony 
obligations). 
 63. In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 1985).  
 64. Hester IV, 752 So. 2d at 270. 
 65. Hester v. Hester (Hester V), 874 So. 2d 859, 860 (La. Ct. App. 2004).  
 66. His actions are summarized in the five reported appeals with full 
decisions: Hester V, 874 So. 2d 859; Hester IV, 752 So. 2d 269; Hester v. Hester 
(Hester III), 708 So. 2d 462 (La. Ct. App. 1998); Hester v. Hester (Hester II), 
699 So. 2d 1099 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Hester v. Hester (Hester I), 680 So. 2d 
1232 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
 67. Hester III, 708 So. 2d at 468 n.5; Hester I, 680 So. 2d at 1235–36. 
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against Mr. Hester for his three other appeals, with the court finding 
that his repetitious filings were intended to harass Mrs. Hester and 
increase her litigation expenses.68 In the court’s final opinion in this 
case, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal stated: “This 
Court has no more tolerance for appellant’s repeated abuse of the 
judicial system in light of the extensive history of the case and the 
tactics Mr. Hester has employed throughout the litigation.”69 
Other harassment appeals have involved former romantic 
partners,70 feuding neighbors,71 and opposing counsel in a lawsuit.72 
Notably, all but one of the parties sanctioned for filing harassment 
appeals were attorneys. 
C. Repetitive Filings 
Appellants who try the courts’ patience by filing repetitive 
appeals of previously litigated issues tend to be sanctioned. Judge 
Miriam Waltzer aptly described this tactic as attempting “to litigate 
the same old issues in new dress.”73 Family-law cases are the most 
common in this category,74 but attorneys who file repetitive appeals 
have also been sanctioned in cases involving workers’ 
compensation,75 succession property,76 torts,77 construction 
contracts,78 and a recalcitrant witness.79 
                                                                                                             
 68. Hester V, 874 So. 2d at 862; Hester IV, 752 So. 2d at 273; Hester III, 
708 So. 2d at 468. 
 69. Hester V, 874 So. 2d at 862.  
 70. See, e.g., Echelon, Inc. v. Cassidy, No. CA 11–1517, 2012 WL 
1142280, at *1 (La. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2012); Bandaries v. Cassidy, 86 So. 3d 
125, 133 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (calling the actions of appellant, an attorney, 
“delusive and disingenuous” having “no other purpose than to harass” his 
former romantic partner). 
 71. See, e.g., Rockett v. Neupert, Nos. 2010 CA 1311–1312, 2011 WL 
1260069, at *1 (La. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2011). 
 72. McMaster v. Progressive Sec. Ins. Co., No. 2013–CA–1411, 2014 WL 
1260979, at *5–6 (La. Ct. App. Mar. 26) (appellant made allegations against his 
opposing counsel that were “thoughtless and needlessly cruel” and “were 
essentially premised on barbershop gossip”), writ granted, 147 So. 3d 687 (La. 
2014) (denying sanctions for frivolous writ application, but awarding damages 
of $10,000 and assessing against the applicant all “legal fees, costs, and 
expenses” in connection with the writ application). 
 73. Gardner v. Gardner, 616 So. 2d 1280, 1281 (La. Ct. App. 1993) 
(attempting to relitigate issues decided in two other final judgments). 
 74. See, e.g., Nesbitt v. Nesbitt, 79 So. 3d 347 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (three 
appeals); Hester V, 874 So. 2d at 861 (five published and numerous unpublished 
appeals); Gardner, 616 So. 2d at 1281 (three appeals). 
 75. See, e.g., Yarnell Ice Cream Co. v. Allen, 867 So. 2d 969, 973 (La. Ct. 
App. 2004) (three appeals). 
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D. No Serious Legal Issue 
“No serious legal issue” is the catch-all category for cases 
where little or no evidence was introduced at trial80 or where the 
appellant files poorly written appellate briefs that lack citation to 
authority.81 “No serious legal issue” is also the reason given for 
sanctioning an appeal when the appellant fails to file a brief.82 One 
court explained that because the “appellant has not filed a brief 
specifying any error, it is difficult for us to find that he seriously 
believed in the merits of his position.”83 It is also used when 
attorneys raise issues that are long settled without a sincere 
argument for change.84 
                                                                                                             
 
 76. See, e.g., In re Succession of Horn, 827 So. 2d 1241, 1247–48 (La. Ct. 
App. 2002) (noting the trial court sought to deter “repetitious filing and pursuit 
of meritless, duplicative claims”). 
 77. See, e.g., Olympia Roofing Co. v. Henican, 534 So. 2d 16, 18–19 (La. 
Ct. App. 1988) (noting the previous frivolous appeal in federal court and stating 
appellant and its counsel were “no strangers to the frivolous appeal”). 
 78. See, e.g., James A. Teague Rental Equip., Inc. v. Audubon Park 
Comm’n, 631 So. 2d 1299, 1301 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (stating appellant 
“persist[ed] in attempting to relitigate an issue that has been decided by a 
judgment that is final and definitive”). 
 79. See, e.g., Johnson v. Nguyen, 793 So. 2d 370, 375 (La. Ct. App. 2001) 
(“It is entirely unreasonable that an attorney can believe that his position is 
reasonable when the court to which he is appealing has already decided the 
identical issues and he was counsel for the appellant in the previous appeal.” 
(emphasis altered)). 
 80. See, e.g., Broussard v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 778 So. 2d 1199, 1205 (La. 
Ct. App. 2001) (appellant had produced no witnesses at trial and introduced no 
exhibits). 
 81. See, e.g., Smith v. Clement, 797 So. 2d 151, 159 (La. Ct. App. 2001); 
Mitchell v. Accent Constr. Co., 785 So. 2d 864, 866 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (brief 
“failed to include any authority”); Zeringue v. Zeringue, 654 So. 2d 721, 723 
(La. Ct. App. 1995) (appellant’s “brief contained only two pages of argument” 
and did not attempt to distinguish the case relied on by the trial court); Valet v. 
City of Hammond, 577 So. 2d 155, 164 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (brief did “not even 
discuss the applicable law”); Owens v. Jackson, 550 So. 2d 359, 366 (La. Ct. 
App. 1989) (brief “was at best, poor” and “cited inadequately few cases or legal 
authorities”); Roland v. Roland, 519 So. 2d 1177, 1179 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (the 
assignments of error “were scantily briefed”). 
 82. See, e.g., Capital-Union Savings, F.A. v. Williams, 528 So. 2d 187, 188 
(La. Ct. App. 1988); Succession of Chapman, 699 So. 2d 916, 916 (La. Ct. App. 
1997); Succession of Pauli, 688 So. 2d 98, 98–99 (La. Ct. App. 1997). 
 83. Arnona v. Arnona, 497 So. 2d 9, 10 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting 
Ecopur, Inc. v. C.E. McCloud, 432 So. 2d 380, 381 (La. Ct. App. 1983)). 
 84. See, e.g., I.D.C., Inc. v. Natchitoches Dev. Co., 482 So. 2d 958, 961 (La. 
Ct. App. 1986) (appellant sanctioned who “raise[d] an issue that has long been 
buried by the weight of judicial opinion and scholarly treatise”). 
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IV. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS THWARTING THE 
AWARD OF SANCTIONS 
Even when a case fits into one of the categories just described, 
the Louisiana lawyer still faces a hurdle that has tripped many 
seeking frivolous-appeal sanctions—following the proper procedure. 
In approximately 17% of the cases where frivolous appeals were 
denied in the past 30 years, the reason given by the appellate court 
was the failure of the appellee to follow the proper procedure.85 
Procedural problems that arise occasionally include asking for 
frivolous-appeal damages prematurely when there was no final 
judgment;86 asking for frivolous-appeal damages under Louisiana 
Code of Civil Procedure article 863, which applies only in the trial 
court;87 and asking the trial court, rather than the appellate court, to 
award damages for a frivolous appeal.88 The two most common 
procedural mistakes, however, are failing to file a cross-appeal or 
answer to appeal,89 and filing a cross-appeal or answer to appeal 
too late.90 
A. Failure to File Answer to Appeal 
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2133(A) requires 
that a party answer an appeal within 15 days of the return date91 or 
                                                                                                             
 85. The courts gave procedural flaws as the reason for not awarding 
damages under article 2164 in 128 out of 751 cases where sanctions were denied 
between 1985 and 2015. For a description of the methodology used in 
calculating these statistics, see supra note 12. 
 86. See Stephens v. Strahan, 62 So. 3d 894, 897 (La. Ct. App. 2011). The 
bulk of the procedural blame in this case was on the appellant, who appealed 
prematurely. 
 87. See Hornot v. Cardenas, No. 2010 CA 1569, 2011 WL 1103151, at *5 
(La. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2011); Calahan v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 743 So. 2d 690 
(La. Ct. App. 1999). 
 88. See Schmitt v. Schmitt, 28 So. 3d 537, 543 (La. Ct. App. 2009) 
(appellee filed answer to appeal in trial court); Clement v. Graves, 924 So. 2d 
196, 201–02 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (appellee filed motion to dismiss the appeal 
and for damages in trial court). 
 89. Requests for frivolous-appeal sanctions were denied for failure to file a 
cross-appeal or answer to appeal in 118 of 751 cases where sanctions were 
denied between 1985 and 2015. 
 90. Requests for frivolous-appeal sanctions were denied as untimely in six 
cases between 1985 and 2015. 
 91. The return date, which the trial court sets in the order for appeal, is the 
deadline for the record to be filed with the appellate court. See LA. CODE CIV. 
PROC. art. 2121 (2015); LA. CT. APP. R. 2-2.3. 
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the date the record is lodged with the appellate court,92 whichever 
is later,93 if he seeks modification of the judgment or damages 
against the appellant. The answer must be filed in the court of 
appeal, not in the trial court.94 Alternatively, the appellee seeking 
modification of the judgment or damages may also file a separate 
cross-appeal.95 Louisiana courts have long held that this requirement 
applies to parties seeking damages for frivolous appeal.96 
In many cases where sanctions were denied for procedural 
reasons, the attorney asked for sanctions only in the appellate brief 
or at oral argument.97 Although some courts have treated a motion 
                                                                                                             
 92. The lodging date is the date the record is actually filed with the court of 
appeal. 
 93. Article 2133(A) provides in pertinent part:  
An appellee shall not be obliged to answer the appeal unless he desires 
to have the judgment modified, revised, or reversed in part or unless he 
demands damages against the appellant. In such cases, he must file an 
answer to the appeal, stating the relief demanded, not later than fifteen 
days after the return day or the lodging of the record whichever is later. 
The answer filed by the appellee shall be equivalent to an appeal on his 
part from any portion of the judgment rendered against him in favor of 
the appellant and of which he complains in his answer. 
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2133(A) (2015). 
 94. In Schmitt v. Schmitt, the appellee’s request for frivolous-appeal damages 
was denied because he filed the answer in the trial court. See 28 So. 3d 537, 543 
(La. Ct. App. 2009). 
 95. In Scramuzza v. River Oaks, Inc., the first appellant moved to dismiss 
the cross-appeal, contending that the second appellant was limited to filing an 
answer to appeal under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2133. See 871 
So. 2d 522, 528 (La. Ct. App. 2004). The court disagreed, stating: 
[N]either the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure nor the jurisprudence 
has ever recognized the answer to an appeal established by Article 2133 
as the exclusive procedural device for an appellee to seek modification, 
revision or reversal of a final judgment. While an appellee may seek 
appellate review by answering another party’s previously filed appeal 
within the delays established by Article 2133, that appellee may also 
seek that same review by filing a separate cross-appeal under Article 
2121 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, within the delays 
allowed by Article 2123 for a suspensive appeal or Article 2087 for a 
devolutive appeal.  
Id. 
 96. See, e.g., Ansley v. Stuart, 52 So. 545, 545 (La. 1910) (on rehearing); 
Verges v. Noel, 17 La. Ann. 67, 67 (1865).  
 97. See, e.g., Guerrero v. Guerrero, 110 So. 3d 723, 728 (La. Ct. App. 2013) 
(answer “incorporated” in brief and not filed as a separate pleading was both 
untimely and procedurally deficient); Roberts v. Robicheaux, 896 So. 2d 1232, 
1235 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (“Appellee’s ‘Answer Brief’ . . . [was] neither an 
answer nor an appeal” and did not satisfy the requirements of article 2133); 
Bolzoni v. Theriot, 670 So. 2d 783, 785 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (request only in 
brief did not satisfy requirements of article 2133); Benoit v. Fleet Fin., Inc., 602 
So. 2d 182, 186 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (court cannot consider a request made only 
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for sanctions as an answer to appeal, Louisiana courts have never 
regarded filing a brief as a satisfactory substitute. In 1865, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court denied a request for frivolous-appeal 
sanctions that were requested only by brief, stating: “Counsel’s brief 
is not considered an answer.”98 Similarly, in 1931, the court refused 
to award damages for an appeal that was “plainly frivolous” when 
the damages were requested only in oral argument and brief.99 
Thus, the rule that damages for frivolous appeal must be 
requested in an answer to appeal or cross-appeal has been established 
through 150 years of jurisprudence. In cases of extremely bad 
behavior, however, some courts have either ignored the rule, created 
an exception, expansively interpreted the Code of Civil Procedure, or 
turned to their own inherent power to protect the judicial process.  
1. Ignoring the Rule 
In one case, the court ignored the answer-or-cross-appeal 
requirement. In Haley v. Leary, a pro se plaintiff sued all of the 
judges and justices who denied the relief he sought in a child-
custody case and appealed when his case was dismissed on the 
basis of judicial immunity.100 Although the appellees did not ask 
for sanctions, the appellate court, sua sponte, cited the standard for 
sanctioning frivolous appeals and remanded the case to the district 
court to determine whether the plaintiff’s conduct was 
contemptuous.101  
Cases where judges ignore the rules of civil procedure 
regarding frivolous appeals are rare, however. Even when a court 
considers an appeal “utterly worthless,” the court usually will not 
grant sanctions on its own.102 Perhaps the strongest example of a 
court feeling bound to follow the rules of civil procedure in a 
frivolous-appeal context is Johnson v. Nguyen.103 In that case, the 
                                                                                                             
 
in brief); Succession of Vallette, 538 So. 2d 707, 709 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (issue 
of frivolous-appeal damages not properly raised by brief). 
 98. Verges, 17 La. Ann. at 67.  
 99. Gaughan v. J.J. Lips, Inc., 137 So. 363, 363 (La. Ct. App. 1931).  
 100. Haley v. Leary, 69 So. 3d 430, 432 (La. Ct. App. 2010). 
 101. Id. at 433–34.  
 102. See, e.g., Washington v. State, No. 14–154, 2014 WL 2558205, at *1 
(La. Ct. App. June 4, 2014) (“Had [appellee] sought sanctions for frivolous 
appeal, they would have been gladly and freely granted.”); Ketteringham Bldrs., 
LLC v. Speni, No. CA 11–107, 2011 WL 2437907, at *1 (La. Ct. App. June 15, 
2011) (appellant’s “lone assignment of error is so utterly devoid of merit that, 
had counsel for [appellee] sought damages for frivolous appeal, they would have 
been seriously considered.”). 
 103. 793 So. 2d 370 (La. Ct. App. 2001).  
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Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment 
imposing contempt-of-court sanctions on a doctor whose behavior 
it termed “egregious” in evading the discovery process.104 The court 
described the doctor’s numerous appeals as “at best, frivolous, and 
at worst, a carefully orchestrated manipulation of the legal 
process.”105 It then stated that sanctions should be imposed because 
to “allow this type of action would be equivalent to a total disregard 
for this Court’s own precedent, and for the integrity of the legal 
system as a whole, it cannot be tolerated.”106 The court’s decree, 
however, simply affirmed the trial court’s sanctions without 
imposing frivolous-appeal sanctions.107 The reason was explained in 
Judge Patricia Murray’s concurrence: “As the appellees did not 
answer this appeal nor file an appeal, the issue of their entitlement to 
additional sanctions and/or sanctions for frivolous appeal cannot be 
considered by this court.”108 
2. Creating an Exception 
Instead of ignoring the lack of an answer to appeal, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court overcame the problem by creating an 
exception to the rule in Bouzon v. Bouzon.109 In that case, the 
appellee filed a motion to dismiss an appeal as frivolous within the 
15-day period to answer the appeal and requested sanctions in the 
motion.110 The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal found that 
damages and attorney fees were warranted because the wife’s “sole 
purpose” in appealing was continuing alimony during the pendency 
of the litigation.111 It declined to sanction the appellant, however, 
                                                                                                             
 104. Id. at 375.  
 105. Id. at 374.  
 106. Id. at 375. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 376 (Murray, J., concurring). Five years earlier, Judge Murray 
concurred in another frivolous-appeal case, Hester v. Hester (Hester I), 680 So. 
2d 1232 (La. Ct. App. 1996). In that case Judge Murray stated that the court 
should be allowed to award sanctions, even though the appellant had not 
answered the appeal, as follows: 
I write because I do not agree that this court is without the authority to 
impose sanctions for a frivolous appeal unless the appellee has 
requested that sanctions be imposed in either an appeal or an answer to 
the appeal. I believe that art. 2164 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
would allow the appellate court to impose sanctions on its own motion 
if it determines that same are just, legal and proper based on the record 
on appeal. 
Id. at 1237 (Murray, J., concurring). 
 109. 532 So. 2d 1386 (La. 1988). 
 110. Id. at 1387. 
 111. Bouzon v. Bouzon, 527 So. 2d 357, 359 (La. Ct. App. 1988). 
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because the appellee failed to appeal or answer the appeal.112 The 
Louisiana Supreme Court granted the appellee’s application for a writ 
of certiorari and summarily remanded the case to the court of appeal 
“to award damages and attorney fees for a frivolous appeal.”113 Two 
justices dissented. Justice Lemmon concurred, explaining: “The 
motion, filed within the delay for answering the appeal, should be 
treated as an answer.”114 
On remand, the Fifth Circuit noted that the Louisiana Supreme 
Court’s memorandum opinion did not explain “what constitutes an 
answer.”115 Instead, the Supreme Court cryptically cited Arnoult v. 
Arnoult,116 another memorandum opinion in which the court 
reversed an award of damages for frivolous appeal.117 In Arnoult, 
the court stated: “Plaintiff respondent did not answer appeal or 
otherwise pray for such damages.”118 
Without citing the Bouzon exception or discussing the date of 
filing, the Third Circuit treated a motion to dismiss as “tantamount 
to filing an answer to appeal.”119 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit 
noted that an appellee had not filed an answer to appeal or cross-
appeal but characterized the request in the brief for frivolous-
appeal damages as a “motion for damages for frivolous appeal” 
and fully addressed the issue.120 In one case, a court stated that the 
motion to dismiss an appeal as frivolous was “in the nature of an 
answer to the appeal” but denied the request because the motion 
was filed more than 15 days after lodging.121 In several other cases 
where the appellee moved to dismiss and asked for sanctions, 
however, courts have not mentioned the Bouzon exception or the 
date that the motion was filed but have simply used the failure to 
file an appeal or answer to appeal as a reason for denial.122 
                                                                                                             
 112. Id. 
 113. Bouzon, 532 So. 2d at 1387. 
 114. Id. (Lemmon, J., concurring). 
 115. Bouzon v. Bouzon, 537 So. 2d 822, 823 (La. Ct. App. 1989). 
 116. 498 So. 2d 749 (La. 1986). 
 117. Bouzon, 537 So. 2d at 823. 
 118. Arnoult, 498 So. 2d at 749 (emphasis added). 
 119. Varney v. Varney, No. 12–640, 2012 WL 6028889, at *9 (La. Ct. App. 
Dec. 5, 2012). 
 120. Levy v. Levy, 829 So. 2d 640, 644, 650 (La. Ct. App. 2002). See also 
Succession of Granger v. Worthington, 829 So. 2d 1108, 1110 (La. Ct. App. 
2002). Appellee filed a cross-appeal on a procedural ground but also filed a 
separate “Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees,” which was referred to the merits 
and ruled on. Granger, 829 So. 2d at 1110. 
 121. Nat’l Equity Life Ins. Co. v. Eicher, 633 So. 2d 1351, 1356 (La. Ct. 
App. 1994). See also Benedict v. Kearby, 537 So. 2d 870, 871 (La. Ct. App. 
1989). 
 122. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Humphrey, 614 So. 2d 837, 848 (La. Ct. App. 
1993) (stating in response to a motion to dismiss appeal and request for damages 
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3. Expansively Interpreting the Code 
In two recent cases, Davisson v. O’Brien123 and Nesbitt v. 
Nesbitt,124 the Second Circuit awarded attorney fees for frivolous 
appeal in the absence of an answer or cross-appeal by interpreting 
article 2164 as providing it with discretion to do so. Both involved 
bad behavior in domestic cases.125  
Davisson simply quoted Nesbitt and the cases it cited. In Nesbitt, 
the appellee asked for sanctions for frivolous appeal, including 
attorney fees, only in her brief.126 The court stated that article 2164 
“grants the appellate court the authority to address the issue of 
frivolous appeal from the proceedings conducted before it” and that 
“the issue of frivolous appeal first arises at the appellate court level 
and therefore may be adjudicated and remedied by this court.”127 
The court relied on two cases involving statutorily sanctioned 
attorney fees,128 Gandy v. United Services Automobile Ass’n129 and 
Smith v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp.,130 as authority for the proposition 
that “when an issue of attorney’s fees is present in the case, it is 
within the appellate court’s discretion to award or increase 
                                                                                                             
 
that, “[n]either of these actions is sufficient to warrant consideration of her claim 
for damages”); Succession of Bleuler, 600 So. 2d 791, 792 (La. Ct. App. 1992) 
(noting that motion to dismiss appeal was not “procedurally sufficient”); In re 
Liquidation of Hornsby & Landry v. Hornsby, 559 So. 2d 861, 862 (La. Ct. 
App. 1990) (stating “damages for frivolous appeal cannot be claimed on a 
motion to dismiss”); Napoli v. Napoli, 536 So. 2d 839, 840 (La. Ct. App. 1988) 
(stating “damages cannot be claimed in a motion to dismiss an appeal”). 
 123. 104 So. 3d 467 (La. Ct. App. 2012). 
 124. 79 So. 3d 347 (La. Ct. App. 2011). 
 125. Davisson sued the social worker who testified in a custody case that he 
abused his child. Davisson, 104 So. 3d at 468–69. He appealed when the suit 
was dismissed on the basis of statutory immunity. Id. at 472. The court referred 
to the handling of the suit as “unprofessional and unduly confrontational,” the 
litigation as “painful and venomous,” and the attorney’s conduct and tactics as 
“reprehensible.” Id. at 476. Nesbitt, an attorney, filed repetitive pleadings stating 
no cause of action in a community-property squabble, including seeking a 
declaration that a property settlement judgment could “be paid in wine.” Nesbitt, 
79 So. 3d at 350, 351, 353. 
 126. Nesbitt, 79 So. 3d at 352. 
 127. Id. at 353. 
 128. Attorney fees are awarded under Louisiana law only when “authorized 
by statute or provided for by contract.” Sharbono v. Steve Lang & Son Loggers, 
696 So. 2d 1382, 1386 (La. 1997). 
 129. 721 So. 2d 34 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (discussing the arbitrary and 
capricious behavior by an insurer in refusing to pay a claim). 
 130. 4 So. 3d 983 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (discussing the unreasonable refusal to 
authorize surgery in a workers’ compensation claim). 
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attorney’s fees for the expense of the appeal regardless of whether 
the appellee answered the appeal.”131  
In Gandy, the court held that it could not increase the attorney 
fees for the work done in the trial court without an answer to 
appeal.132 Without citing any authority, however, it held that it 
could award additional attorney fees for work done at the appellate 
level because those fees were “not an issue in the trial court.”133 
Smith cited Gandy as authority in awarding attorney fees without 
an answer to appeal.134 
The best explanation of an appellate court’s authority to award 
attorney fees on appeal when no answer to appeal has been filed is 
found in Judge Billie Woodard’s dissent in Perot v. Link Staffing 
Services.135 Judge Woodard authored the majority opinion that 
denied a workers’ compensation claimant additional attorney fees 
for work done at the appellate level because “[o]n the basis of La. 
Code Civ. P. art. 2133, the jurisprudence of this circuit mandates 
that we do not consider such a demand if not made pursuant to an 
appeal or an answer to an appeal.”136 However, she dissented in part 
from her own opinion to express dissatisfaction with her circuit’s 
interpretation of articles 2133 and 2164. 
In her dissent, Judge Woodard described this “body of well 
settled jurisprudence” as “illegitimate” and “an improper application 
of the law.”137 Article 2133 requires an answer to appeal or cross-
appeal when a party seeks to modify, revise, or partially reverse the 
trial court’s judgment or seeks damages against the appellant.138 She 
stated that the Louisiana Legislature did not intend that attorney fees 
be considered damages in that context, citing a case denying pre-
judgment interest on an attorney fee award.139 Further, she opined 
that it is a “logical and legal impossibility” to say that the appellate 
court is amending the trial court’s judgment when it awards 
additional attorney fees for appellate work, as the trial court never 
had authority to award attorney fees for work performed in the 
appellate court.140 Instead, “[t]he appellate court is rendering its own 
                                                                                                             
 131. Nesbitt, 79 So. 3d at 353. 
 132. Gandy, 721 So. 2d at 38. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Smith, 4 So. 3d at 991. 
 135. 744 So. 2d 80 (La. Ct. App. 1999). 
 136. Id. at 87. 
 137. Id. (Woodward, J., dissenting). 
 138. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2133 (2015). 
 139. See Sharbono v. Steve Lang & Son Loggers, 696 So. 2d 1382 (La. 
1997). The court interpreted the word “compensation” in Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 23:1203.1 to exclude penalties and attorney fees. Id. at 1386. 
 140. Perot, 744 So. 2d at 88 (Woodward, J., dissenting). 
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distinct judgment for attorney fees earned for work done on the 
appeal, which only it has the power to do and which is before it, 
only.”141 
Judge Woodard recognized that article 2133 does not provide a 
procedure for requesting attorney fees on appeal. She asserted, 
however, that the language in article 2164 giving the appellate 
courts authority to “render any judgment which is just, legal, and 
proper” provides the appellate court  
with the authority and mechanism for rendering such a 
judgment (especially when a request is made in a brief) 
without necessitating that the Appellee file either an appeal 
or an answer, because implicit within the mandate of 2164 
is the authority for appellate courts to act on their own 
motion when they deem it appropriate.142 
She concluded by describing the rule that requires an answer to 
appeal to award attorney fees as “an old, lame ‘duck’” that should 
be “retire[d] . . . to gumbo.”143 
4. Asserting Inherent Authority 
Federal courts have long recognized that courts have the 
inherent authority to “protect themselves from any attempts to 
interfere with the proper functioning of the courts and the judicial 
process.”144 The United States Supreme Court established in 1812 
that a court has “an implied power to preserve its own existence 
and promote the end and object of its creation.”145 This power 
includes the right to fine for contempt, imprison for contumacy, 
and enforce the observance of order in the courts.146 In 1980, the 
Supreme Court in Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper recognized that 
federal appellate courts have inherent authority to impose sanctions 
for frivolous appeal,147 and many state courts have used this power 
                                                                                                             
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. at 89. Gumbo is a “hearty, soupy stew” usually served over rice. 
Marie Louise Comeaux Manuel, Acadian (Cajun) Cuisine, in CAJUN CUISINE 9–
10 (W. Thomas Angers ed., 1985). Fowl such as duck is a common ingredient. 
See id.; RIVER ROAD RECIPES 13 (1991).  
 144. Robert J. Martineau, Frivolous Appeals: The Uncertain Federal 
Response, 1984 DUKE L.J. 845, 879 (1984). 
 145. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 33 (1812). 
 146. Id. at 34. 
 147. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980). 
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to sanction frivolous litigation, frivolous appeals, and other forms 
of bad behavior by litigants and their counsel.148 
The inherent-powers doctrine is applicable even in a civil-law 
jurisdiction where the only sources of law are legislation and 
custom.149 The Supreme Court has stated that this power “is by no 
means peculiar to the common law” but “belongs to a system of 
universal law.”150 Furthermore, Louisiana judges who have 
advocated for the court’s assertion of inherent authority rely on the 
Legislature’s grant of authority in article 2164, particularly the 
language that it can “render any judgment which is just, legal, and 
proper upon the record on appeal” and tax costs “as in its judgment 
may be considered equitable.”151 
Although no Louisiana court has imposed sanctions for frivolous 
appeal by asserting its inherent authority to do so, Judge Woodard 
asserted the court’s inherent powers under article 2164 to sanction 
an attorney for “nefarious conduct in the trial court.”152 The court 
cited Justice Ortique’s dissent in Hampton, where the majority 
reversed an award of frivolous-appeal sanctions.153 In Hampton, 
                                                                                                             
 148. See, e.g., Dana Commercial Credit Corp. v. Ferns & Ferns, 108 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 278 (2001) (imposing sanctions for filing a frivolous motion on 
appeal); Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Good, 919 N.E.2d 144, 152–56 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2009) (imposing $26,000 in sanctions by trial court for violating motions 
in limine and causing mistrial); Persichini v. William Beaumont Hosp., 607 
N.W.2d 100, 108–09 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (referencing the inherent power to 
impose sanction of attorney fees when “egregious misconduct of a party or an 
attorney causes a mistrial”); Hartsoe v. Tucker, 309 P.3d 39, 42 (Mont. 2013) 
(ordering a litigant who had filed 24 suits in three counties against government 
officials, including nine suits against judges, to obtain prior approval before 
suing any current or former judicial official as sanction for frivolous litigation); 
State ex rel. N.M. State Highway & Transp. Dep’t v. Baca, 896 P.2d 1148, 1155 
(N.M. 1995) (stating that “a court’s inherent authority extends to all conduct 
before that court and encompasses orders intended and reasonably designed to 
regulate the court’s docket, promote judicial efficiency, and deter frivolous 
filings”); Van Eps v. Johnston, 553 A.2d 1089, 1091 (Vt. 1988) (“[C]ourts have 
the inherent power to assess expenses against an attorney in the form of 
consequential damages suffered by the opposing side, such as attorney’s fees 
and witness’s expenses, incurred due to the attorney’s abuse of the judicial 
process.”); In re Attorney Fees in Yu v. Zhang, 637 N.W.2d 754, 762 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 2001) (discussing the inherent authority to manage family-law cases and 
award sanctions for “overtrial”—excessive litigation and appealing multiple 
issues without merit). 
 149. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2015). 
 150. Hudson, 11 U.S. at 34. 
 151. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2164 (2015). 
 152. Brown v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 704 So. 2d 1234, 1237 (La. Ct. App. 
1997). The court affirmed the trial court’s award of over $25,000 in costs to the 
plaintiffs. Id. at 1238. 
 153. Hampton v. Greenfield, 618 So. 2d 859, 865 (La. 1993). 
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Justice Ortique characterized the appellant’s behavior as a “flagrant 
abuse of the judicial process”154 and opined that the court could 
use its inherent powers to impose sanctions, stating:  
Under [Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article] 2164, the 
courts of appeal have the inherent power to fashion and 
impose sanctions. This power is incident to the court’s duty 
to protect the judicial process. This authority is specifically 
conferred by article 2164 . . . . If the appellate court 
determines that the appeal is frivolous, it has the authority 
and responsibility within its supervisory jurisdiction to 
initiate and to decide the question of sanctions.155 
Texas courts have also recognized their inherent authority to 
sanction litigants who abuse the judicial process, but they have not 
used the power to sanction frivolous appeals.156 One commentator 
suggested the reason is because it is simply easier for the courts to 
cite a statute or rule than to rely on inherent authority.157 
B. Failure to Timely File Answer to Appeal 
Even if Louisiana courts treated all briefs and motions for 
sanctions as answers to appeal under Arnoult, those attempts would 
likely fail due to timeliness issues. The appellant’s brief is due 25 
calendar days after the record is lodged with the court of appeal; 
the appellee has 45 days after lodging to file a brief.158 If both 
parties appeal, the appellant who files last is treated as the appellee 
for the purpose of briefing deadlines.159 Thus, a request for 
frivolous-appeal sanctions in a brief will usually be filed more than 
15 days after lodging, making it untimely even if the court were 
inclined to treat the brief as an answer to appeal.160 Even appellees 
                                                                                                             
 154. Id. at 866. 
 155. Id. at 865. 
 156. See David Lopez, Why Texas Courts Are Defenseless Against Frivolous 
Appeals: A Historical Analysis with Proposals for Reform, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 
51, 54 n.5 (1996) (citing Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398–99 
(Tex. 1979)). 
 157. Id. Another commentator suggested that federal courts rarely rely on 
inherent authority to impose sanctions for this reason. See Martineau, supra note 
144, at 862. 
 158. LA. CT. APP. R. 2-12.7. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See, e.g., Guerrero v. Guerrero, 110 So. 3d 723, 728 (La. Ct. App. 
2013); Walker v. Creech, 509 So. 2d 168, 172 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 
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who request frivolous-appeal sanctions in an answer to appeal rather 
than a brief often miss the relatively short 15-day deadline.161  
One difficulty with the short deadline to answer the appeal is 
that the appellee has no way of knowing what the appellant will 
assign as error, as the answer must be filed 10 days before the 
appellant’s brief is due. If an appellee files an answer seeking 
frivolous-appeal damages, he must assume that the appellant will 
raise no novel issues.162 He must also hope that the appellant will 
not state in his brief that the appeal was taken sincerely and not 
simply for delay.163 An appellant who has been forewarned by the 
filing of the answer to appeal may defeat the frivolous-appeal-
damages request by simply proclaiming his sincerity in the brief, 
thereby satisfying the test of Hampton and Parker.164 When that 
happens, many appellees simply abandon their claims for article 
2164 sanctions by not briefing the issue.165 
V. OTHER PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
Even when an attorney follows the correct procedure to request 
frivolous-appeal sanctions, he or she faces other procedural issues. 
Foremost is whether to ask for other relief at the same time he or 
                                                                                                             
 161. See, e.g., Sprowl v. Taylor, No. CA 07-857, 2008 WL 241574, at *3 
(La. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2008); Foreman v. Babin, 887 So. 2d 143, 153 (La. Ct. 
App. 2004); McCoy v. Calalmia, 653 So. 2d 763, 773 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Galle 
v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 623 So. 2d 692, 695 (La. Ct. App. 1993). 
 162. In Matherne v. Purdy, 576 So. 2d 621 (La. Ct. App. 1991), the court 
found that an appeal was not frivolous despite a “glaring lack of . . . basis for 
appeal” because the appellant asserted the issue was “novel.” Id. at 624. 
Similarly, in Hall v. Brookshire Bros., 831 So. 2d 1010 (La. Ct. App. 2002), the 
court found the issues for review “substantively tenuous” but denied damages 
because of “novel legal questions.” Id. at 1030–31. 
 163. See Roy v. Alexandria Civil Serv. Comm’n, 980 So. 2d 225, 229–30 
(La. Ct. App. 2008) (denying damages because “counsel insist[ed] that th[e] 
appeal was not taken for the purpose of delay and that he has been serious”). 
 164. “[W]hen counsel proclaims his sincerity, a court finds itself without just 
cause to disbelieve unless, and only unless, the proposition advocated is so 
ridiculous or so opposed to rational thinking that it is evident beyond any doubt 
that it is being deliberately professed for ulterior purposes.” Hampton v. 
Greenfield, 618 So. 2d 859, 863 (La. 1993) (quoting Parker v. Interstate Life & 
Acc. Ins. Co., 179 So. 2d 634, 637 (La. 1965)). 
 165. See, e.g., Watts v. Watts, 10 So. 3d 855, 861 (La. Ct. App. 2009); Levert 
v. Martinez, 939 So. 2d 615, 619 n.1 (La. Ct. App. 2006); Skelton v. Hunt Forest 
Prods., 787 So. 2d 1216, 1226 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Wilson v. Inessa Stewart’s 
Antiques, Inc., 708 So. 2d 1132, 1135 (La. Ct. App. 1998); Divincenti v. 
Redondo, 486 So. 2d 959, 960 (La. Ct. App. 1986). Rule 2-12.4(B)(4) of the 
Louisiana Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal, provides: “The court may consider 
as abandoned any assignment of error or issue for review which has not been 
briefed.” LA. CT. APP. R. 2-12.4(B)(4). 
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she requests sanctions. Then, if the appellant fails to file an 
appellate brief, the appellee must decide whether to ask that the 
appeal be dismissed as abandoned. Finally, once the request for 
sanctions is properly before the court, the appellee must prove that 
he or she is entitled to damages. Unfortunately, the courts are 
unclear as to how that is to be accomplished or even who should 
award the sanctions. 
A. Appellee’s Request for Other Modifications of Judgment 
A long line of cases holds that frivolous-appeal damages will 
not be awarded if the appellee asks for other relief in his cross-
appeal or answer to appeal.166 The fountainhead for this rule is the 
1824 case Desblieux v. Darbonneaux, which held that where the 
appellee answered the appeal and received an amendment to the 
judgment, he could not claim he was injured by the appeal and thus 
was not entitled to damages.167 In 1853, the court cited Desblieux 
in dicta for the proposition that frivolous-appeal sanctions could 
not be awarded if the appellee received an amendment of the 
judgment.168 By 1874, however, the rule had morphed from no 
sanctions if the appellee successfully asked for amendment to “no 
damages can be allowed where the appellee joins in the appeal, 
however frivolous it may be.”169 This rule has simply been 
repeated over and over with no analysis, except for this statement 
in 2005: “To the extent that the [appellee] has answered the appeal 
and requested modification of the judgment, the [appellee] admits 
that the judgment is at least partially in error.”170  
If the appellee planned to appeal an error in the judgment before 
learning of his opponent’s appeal, he will incur no additional delay 
when his opponent appeals first. Consequently, the opponent’s 
appeal cannot be considered frivolous as “solely for delay.” But an 
appellant can certainly file an appeal raising meritless issues in an 
attempt to harass his opponent, and if that occurs, the appellee is 
damaged because he has to expend time and money dealing with 
                                                                                                             
 166. Abushanab v. St. Charles Gaming Co., 103 So. 3d 1197, 1207 (La. Ct. 
App. 2012); ANR Pipeline Co. v. La. Tax Comm’n, 923 So. 2d 81, 100 (La. Ct. 
App. 2005); Parker, Seale & Kelton v. Messina, 36 So. 2d 724, 728 (La. 1948); 
Dennis v. Huber, 92 So. 126, 127 (La. 1922); Mahan v. Michel, 27 La. Ann. 97, 
97 (1875); Whetstone v. Rawlins, 26 La. Ann. 474, 476 (1874) (on application 
for rehearing). 
 167. Desblieux v. Darbonneaux, 2 Mart. (n.s.) 215, 217 (La. 1824).  
 168. Hood v. Knox, 8 La. Ann. 73, 73 (1853). 
 169. Whetstone, 26 La. Ann. at 476 (emphasis added). The Louisiana Supreme 
Court stated this was based on “settled jurisprudence” but cited no cases. Id. 
 170. ANR Pipeline, 923 So. 2d at 100. 
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those issues. If the appellee is unsuccessful in his attempt to have 
the judgment amended, he should be able to receive reimbursement 
to the extent he was damaged by the frivolous appeal. 
B. Maintenance of Answer to Appeal When Appeal Is Dismissed 
When an appeal is dismissed as abandoned after an answer to 
appeal is filed, the circuits conflict as to whether damages may be 
awarded for frivolous appeal. In Weathers v. Herald Life Insurance 
Co., the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal held that when 
the original appeal is dismissed, the answer, “being unsupported 
and without foundation, falls also,” and that article 2133 “does not 
allow the maintenance of an answer independently of the appeal 
from which it arose.”171 The court opined that the appellee should 
have sought relief through a separate appeal instead of an 
answer.172 Weathers was followed by two other Third Circuit 
cases173 and one from the Fifth Circuit.174 
The Second Circuit, in a well-reasoned opinion in State ex rel. 
Muse v. Ross, expressly declined to follow Weathers and its 
progeny.175 The court noted the language in article 2133 that the 
answer to appeal “shall be equivalent” to a separate appeal176 and 
stated it “would not truly be equivalent” if the appellant could 
cause the answer to fall simply by dismissing his appeal.177 The 
court also cited the official Revision Comments to article 2133, 
which state that filing an answer to appeal is the proper method to 
request damages for frivolous appeal.178 The court thus found that 
the answer to appeal survived dismissal of the original appeal.179  
The court further noted in Muse that the First Circuit had 
awarded damages in two cases where the original appeal was 
dismissed as abandoned and the appellee requested article 2164 
                                                                                                             
 171. Weathers v. Herald Life Ins. Co., 284 So. 2d 624, 625 (La. Ct. App. 
1973). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Crochet v. Pritchard, 509 So. 2d 501 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Moity v. 
Guilliot, 466 So. 2d 511 (La. Ct. App. 1985). 
 174. Edwards v. Lousteau Auto Sales, 424 So. 2d 460 (La. Ct. App. 1982). 
 175. State ex rel. Muse v. Ross, 651 So. 2d 364, 365–66 (La. Ct. App. 1995).  
 176. Article 2133 provides in pertinent part, “The answer filed by the 
appellee shall be equivalent to an appeal on his part from any portion of the 
judgment rendered against him in favor of the appellant and of which he 
complains in his answer.” LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2133 (2015). 
 177. Muse, 651 So. 2d at 365 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 178. Id. at 365. 
 179. Id. at 366. 
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sanctions through an answer to appeal.180 In those cases, the court 
found there was no need for a trial on the merits because it was 
apparent that the appellant did not sincerely believe his appeal had 
merit if he filed no brief and specified no error.181  
This issue has arisen only once since Muse, in a Second Circuit 
case that followed Muse,182 and the Louisiana Supreme Court has 
never ruled on the issue. This author agrees with the court in Muse 
that to allow an appellant to avoid sanctions for frivolous appeal by 
simply dismissing his appeal “hamper[s] the deterrent effect 
provided by the potential for assessment of frivolous appeal 
damages.”183 
C. Proof of Frivolous-Appeal Damages 
The party seeking damages normally has the burden of proof. 
Louisiana courts have never explicitly discussed burden of proof with 
regard to frivolous-appeal sanctions. However, several cases imply 
that the appellee is required to prove through evidence in the record 
that the appellant is insincere or that the appeal was taken merely for 
delay. For example, in Hampton v. Greenfield, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court stated that “nothing in the record suggests that the 
appeal was filed solely for delay.”184 In Neff v. City Planning 
Commission,185 the court denied frivolous-appeal sanctions, stating: 
“Although Mr. Neff contends that this appeal was intended merely to 
delay his return to his position, he offers no evidence of this.”186 
Similarly, in Lucy v. State Farm Insurance Co.,187 the court stated: 
“There is no evidence in the record that this appeal was taken merely 
for delay purposes.”188 In Ritter v. Genovese, the appellee tried to 
prove frivolity through the lack of specificity in the brief, but the court 
                                                                                                             
 180. See Capital-Union Sav., F.A. v. Williams, 528 So. 2d 187, 188 (La. Ct. 
App. 1988); Ecopur, Inc. v. McCloud, 432 So. 2d 380, 381 (La. Ct. App. 1983). 
 181. Capital-Union, 528 So. 2d at 188; Ecopur, 432 So. 2d at 381. 
 182. Succession of Chapman, 699 So. 2d 916 (La. Ct. App. 1997). 
 183. Muse, 651 So. 2d at 366.  
 184. Hampton v. Greenfield, 618 So. 2d 859, 862 (La. 1993) (emphasis 
added). 
 185. 681 So. 2d 6 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
 186. Id. at 9.  
 187. 475 So. 2d 88 (La. Ct. App. 1985). 
 188. Id. at 90 (emphasis added). See also Gagnard v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 
819 So. 2d 489, 496 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (“Plaintiff’s counsel simply urges his 
blanket belief that this appeal lacks legitimate bases, without offering any 
evidence whatsoever that it was taken for delay or that counsel was insincere.”). 
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denied sanctions because it had “no record proof of defendant's 
alleged dilatory and deficient actions.”189  
The difficulty here is that Louisiana appellate courts are courts 
of record; they may not review evidence that is not in the record, 
nor may they receive evidence.190 As the Louisiana Third Circuit 
explained: “The record on appeal includes the pleadings, court 
minutes, transcript, jury instructions, judgments, and other rulings 
unless otherwise designated. . . . [F]acts referred to solely in the 
arguments of counsel, in brief or otherwise, are not considered 
record evidence.”191 Requiring an appellee to point to evidence in 
the trial court record proving that an appeal was taken solely for 
delay is an almost impossible burden.  
Furthermore, the courts have held that they should look to the 
nature of the appeal to determine whether an appeal is frivolous, 
rather than to the actions of the appellant that gave rise to the lawsuit 
or the behavior during trial.192 The trial court record contains 
evidence of the actions giving rise to the suit and the behavior 
during trial but tells the appellate court nothing about the nature of 
the appeal. 
Despite the language in the jurisprudence, courts often cite 
assertions of sincerity in an appellant’s brief or at appellate oral 
argument to deny sanctions,193 and cite actions in the appellate court 
such as failing to appear for oral argument or filing briefs that cite 
no legal authority as evidence of insincerity.194 Some courts also 
admit to considering both the record and the briefs, denying 
sanctions because neither contain evidence of lack of sincerity or 
dilatory tactics.195 
                                                                                                             
 189. Ritter v. Genovese, 740 So. 2d 807, 810 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis 
added). 
 190. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2164 (2015) (“The appellate court shall render 
any judgment which is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal.” 
(emphasis added)); Cao v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 119 So. 3d 725, 729 (La. Ct. 
App. 2013). 
 191. Abushanab v. St. Charles Gaming Co., 103 So. 3d 1197, 1201 (La. Ct. 
App. 2012) (quoting Thomas v. Connolly, 726 So. 2d 1052, 1054 (La. Ct. App. 
1999)). 
 192. Jordan v. City of Baton Rouge, 652 So. 2d 701, 705–06 (La. Ct. App. 
1995); Fudge v. Levine, 647 So. 2d 405, 409 (La. Ct. App. 1994). 
 193. See, e.g., Haney v. Davis, 925 So. 2d 591, 599 (La. Ct. App. 2006); Fisk 
v. Mathews, 525 So. 2d 223, 227 (La. Ct. App. 1988).  
 194. See, e.g., Bankston v. Alexandria Neurosurgical Clinic, 583 So. 2d 
1148, 1155 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Allen v. IMTC, Inc., 567 So. 2d 1155, 1159 
(La. Ct. App. 1990). 
 195. See, e.g., Tee It Up Golf, Inc. v. Bayou State Constr., L.L.C., 30 So. 3d 
1159, 1162 (La. Ct. App. 2010); Petrocana, Inc. v. William H. Kenny 
Consultants, Ltd., 595 So. 2d 384, 386 (La. Ct. App. 1992).  
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D. Determining Which Court Assesses Damages 
Appellate courts can determine the amount of attorney fees to 
award on appeal based on the skill of the attorney and the effort 
required on appeal,196 which the judges witness firsthand from the 
appellate briefs and oral arguments. Thus, when the sanction imposed 
is attorney fees, the appellate courts usually set the amount of the 
sanctions themselves.197 However, some courts have remanded cases 
to the trial court to take evidence and determine the amount of attorney 
fees,198 as an appellate court cannot receive evidence. In one puzzling 
case, the court set an amount for “sanctions” for a frivolous writ 
application but also remanded “for a hearing to determine the 
appropriate amount of sanctions, representing respondent’s legal fees 
and costs incurred in defending this matter in the trial court.”199 
When damages in addition to attorney fees are awarded, appellate 
courts are more likely to remand to the trial court to take evidence of 
the damages. In one case, the appellate court remanded to take 
evidence of the “extent, if any, the appellant has been unjustly 
enriched and the appellee unjustly damaged by the appellant’s 
continual receipt of alimony pendente lite during the course of the 
appeal.”200 And in an eviction suit, the court remanded to the trial 
court for it to take evidence on the amount of rent the appellee lost 
during the appeal.201 
                                                                                                             
 196. Nesbitt v. Nesbitt, 79 So. 3d 347, 353 (La. Ct. App. 2011). 
 197. See, e.g., Succession of Horn, 827 So. 2d 1241, 1248 (La. Ct. App. 
2002) (remanding the case to trial court “for a hearing to determine the amount 
of attorney’s fees [appellee] has incurred in defending against [appellant’s] last 
amending petition” but setting the sanction of attorney fees on appeal at $1,000). 
 198. See, e.g., Stumpf v. Richardson, 748 So. 2d 1225, 1228 (La. Ct. App. 
1999); Blake v. Mosquito Control Bd., 470 So. 2d 193, 202 (La. Ct. App. 1985) 
(remanding for a hearing to determine attorney fees “[b]ecause there [was] no 
evidence contained in the record dealing with the attorney’s fees incurred by” 
appellant). 
 199. Hester v. Hester (Hester II), 699 So. 2d 1099, 1102 (La. Ct. App. 1997). It 
is unclear from the opinion whether the court was assessing $2,000 as a penalty in 
addition to legal fees and costs or whether the court meant that attorney fees were 
$2,000 and the trial court was to determine the total figure by adding costs. Id. 
 200. Lupberger v. Lupberger, 805 So. 2d 264, 275 (La. Ct. App. 2001) 
(quoting Lupberger v. Lupberger, 739 So. 2d 1026 (La. Ct. App. 1999)). The 
trial court failed to do so, and the appellate court eventually made the 
assessment on its own, awarding legal interest on the alimony payments. Id.  
 201. Arnona v. Arnona, 497 So. 2d 9, 10 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (ordering the 
trial court to calculate the amount of attorney fees). 
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VI. TYPES OF SANCTIONS AWARDED AND AGAINST WHOM 
Nationwide, sanctions for frivolous appeal include a percentage of 
the judgment;202 a cash penalty, payable to the appellee, against the 
appellant, his attorney, or both;203 a cash penalty or fine payable to the 
court;204 attorney fees;205 a contempt finding;206 single or double 
damages;207 single, double, or treble costs;208 interest;209 dismissal of 
the appeal;210 or a combination of these penalties. Louisiana courts 
may award costs and damages, including attorney fees or a percentage 
of the judgment. They may not, however, dismiss an appeal for 
frivolity or award a penalty or fine payable to the court, and no 
Louisiana appellant has ever been held in contempt for filing a 
frivolous appeal. 
A. Attorney Fees and Other Monetary Awards 
The predecessor statute to article 2164, Louisiana Code of Practice 
article 907,211 limited awards to 10% of the amount in dispute and 
were allowed only on a suspensive appeal from a money judgment.212 
This left courts without a way to penalize either unsuccessful plaintiffs 
who appealed frivolously213 or frivolous appellants in suits that did not 
involve money judgments, such as in custody cases. 
                                                                                                             
 202. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 5-6-6 (2013) (“When in the opinion of the 
court the case was taken up for delay only, 10 percent damages may be awarded 
by the appellate court upon any judgment for a sum certain which has been 
affirmed.”). 
 203. See, e.g., GA. CT. APP. R. 15 (requiring the penalty not to exceed 
$2,500). 
 204. See, e.g., ARK. R. APP. PROC. CIV. 11. 
 205. See, e.g., ALASKA R. APP. PROC. 508(e)(2); HAW. R. APP. PROC. 38. 
 206. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. PROC. 25.  
 207. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. PROC. 38 (“just damages”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 12-349(A) (2003) (double, but not to exceed $5,000). “Damages” 
specifically includes attorney fees in many states, including Louisiana. See LA. 
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2164 (2015).  
 208. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. PROC. 38 (single or double); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 
14, § 1802 (2013) (treble); N.C. R. APP. PROC. 34 (single or double); N.D. R. 
APP. PROC. 38 (single or double); UTAH R. APP. PROC. 33 (single or double). 
 209. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 490:14-a (2009) (stating the “interest 
at the rate of 12 percent per annum on any amount which has been previously 
found due or for which a verdict has been recovered or which the moving party 
has been ordered to pay,” in addition to double costs). 
 210. See, e.g., N.C. R. APP. PROC. 34; OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 995 (2000). 
 211. LA. CODE PRAC. art. 907 (Dart 1942).  
 212. Stephenson, supra note 13, at 138. 
 213. As one commentator noted: “[T]he use of an appeal to harry a defendant 
into compromise is quite as lamentable as its employment by defendants to 
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Article 2164 gives the courts much more discretion. It does not 
specify the types of damages that may be awarded for frivolous appeal 
or even against whom the damages can be assessed. The 2010 
amendment added the phrase “including attorney fees,” which simply 
codified what Louisiana courts had been doing for at least 40 years 
under the theory that the appellee’s principal damages are what he 
“must pay his attorney to answer the appeal in order to establish that 
the appeal is frivolous.”214 That amendment quelled any qualms 
judges might have had over awarding attorney fees in light of the long-
established rule in Louisiana that attorney fees could not be awarded 
except where authorized by contract or statute.215 
The first cases awarding frivolous-appeal damages after article 
2164’s enactment in 1961 simply awarded a percentage of the 
judgment.216 More recent cases tend to award a sum of money 
characterized alternatively as “legal fees,”217 “penalties,”218 
“damages,”219 or, most commonly, “attorney’s fees.”220 Occasionally, 
a court awards both damages and attorney fees.221 
                                                                                                             
 
delay satisfaction of a judgment.” Note, Penalties for Frivolous Appeals, 43 
HARV. L. REV. 113, 117 (1929).  
 214. Samford v. Samford, 297 So. 2d 465, 468 (La. Ct. App. 1974). 
 215. See Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 988 So. 2d 186, 201 (La. 2008). Before 
the 2010 amendment, the courts explained that the rule prohibiting attorney fees 
except when authorized by contract or statute did not apply because the 
appellee’s liability for attorney fees for defending a groundless appeal “does not 
occur until after rendition of the judgment by the lower court and the perfecting 
of the appeal [and] cannot be claimed in the original suit. As a consequence, the 
usual rule of denying recovery for attorney’s fees unless provided by contract or 
statute has no application.” Boulet v. Foti, 539 So. 2d 843, 845 (La. Ct. App. 
1989) (quoting Samford, 297 So. 2d at 468). 
 216. See, e.g., Bader Fin. Co. v. Asset, 169 So. 2d 220, 221 (La. Ct. App. 
1964) (5% of the principal amount of the judgment); Hous. Oil Field Material 
Co. v. Creole Explorations, Inc., 150 So. 2d 48, 50 (La. Ct. App. 1963) (5% of 
the principal and accrued interest). 
 217. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 954 So. 2d 272, 275 (La. 
Ct. App. 2007). 
 218. See, e.g., Hughes v. Fabio, 983 So. 2d 946, 954 (La. Ct. App. 2008). 
 219. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 986 So. 2d 797, 802 (La. Ct. App. 2008); 
Lafayette City Parish Consol. Gov’t v. Dien’s Auto Salvage, Inc., 916 So. 2d 
384, 395 (La. Ct. App. 2005). 
 220. See, e.g., Davisson v. O’Brien, 104 So. 3d 467, 476 (La. Ct. App. 2012); 
Nesbitt v. Nesbitt, 79 So. 3d 347, 353 (La. Ct. App. 2011). 
 221. See, e.g., Voiron v. Voiron, 897 So. 2d 697, 699 (La. Ct. App. 2004) 
(imposing $500 in damages and $1,000 in attorney fees; noting in a footnote that 
article 2164 allows the award of damages); Hester v. Hester (Hester IV), 752 So. 
2d 269, 273 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (awarding $3,000 in attorney fees and 
“sanctioned and fined” the appellant $5,000, payable to the appellee). 
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The two most common types of damages awarded in addition to 
attorney fees are lost rent in cases where frivolous appeals postponed 
evictions222 and the return of alimony pendente lite paid where 
frivolous appeals postponed termination of the marriage.223 Alimony 
pendente lite was Louisiana’s version of interim spousal support, 
which terminated when a judgment of divorce became final. In 1997, 
the Louisiana Legislature amended the law regarding spousal support 
and separated the awarding of support from the rendition of a support 
judgment.224 The amendments eliminated the incentive to appeal 
divorce judgments; the last two reported cases seeking damages for 
frivolous appeal in alimony cases involved suits for divorce that were 
filed in 1997.225 
B. Amount of Monetary Sanctions 
Louisiana courts have accurately described the monetary sanctions 
awarded in Louisiana frivolous-appeal cases as “modest.”226 Over the 
past 30 years, awards have ranged from a low of $250227 to a high of 
$20,000,228 with the most recent award being $1,000.229 Although the 
amount of the awards seems to be increasing slightly, three cases in 
the last decade awarded less than $1,000 in sanctions.230 
                                                                                                             
 222. See, e.g., Wilson v. Fuqua, 553 So. 2d 926, 928 (La. Ct. App. 1989); 
Arnona v. Arnona, 497 So. 2d 9, 10 (La. Ct. App. 1986). 
 223. Roland v. Roland, 519 So. 2d 1177, 1179–80 (La. Ct. App. 1987) 
(awarding attorney fees, return of alimony paid while the suit was pending, and 
return of one-half of the mortgage payments that appellee made on the family 
home while not allowed to live there); Schnatz v. Schnatz, 501 So. 2d 318, 320 
(La. Ct. App. 1987) (awarding attorney fees plus $750 in damages, stating that 
“the sole purpose of the appeal was delay in order for her eligibility for alimony 
pendente lite payments to continue”). 
 224. Kenneth Rigby, The 1997 Spousal Support Act, 58 LA. L. REV. 887, 
898–99 (1998). 
 225. Lupberger v. Lupberger, 805 So. 2d 264, 266 (La. Ct. App. 2001); 
Lemoine v. Lemoine, 715 So. 2d 1244, 1245 (La. Ct. App. 1998). 
 226. In re Clement, 46 So. 3d 804, 809 (La. Ct. App. 2010); Yarnell Ice 
Cream Co. v. Allen, 867 So. 2d 969, 973 (La. Ct. App. 2004). 
 227. River Parish Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Stewart, 474 So. 2d 1025, 1027 (La. Ct. 
App. 1985). 
 228. Hester v. Hester (Hester V), 874 So. 2d 859, 862 (La. Ct. App. 2004). 
 229. Cox v. O’Brien, 147 So. 3d 809, 817 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, No. 
2014-C-1907, 2014 WL 6725688 (La. Nov. 21, 2014). 
 230. Gray v. Gray, No. 2011 CA 2360, 2012 WL 4501002, at *1 (La. Ct. 
App. Oct. 1, 2012) (awarding $750); Johnson v. Johnson, 986 So. 2d 797, 802 
(La. Ct. App. 2008) (awarding $500); Lindsey v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 954 So. 
2d 272, 275 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (awarding $750).  
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C. Dismissal of Appeal as a “Sanction” 
A sanction is a penalty or punishment.231 Dismissal of an appeal 
is technically not a sanction because a frivolous appeal will ultimately 
be unsuccessful;232 dismissal simply hastens the process. However, 
federal courts treat summary dismissal as a sanction, and many states’ 
rules specifically list dismissal as a sanction.233 Although Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 does not mention dismissal,234 federal 
courts have inherent power to dismiss an appeal taken in bad faith.235 
Furthermore, many of the federal circuits have enacted local rules that 
explicitly provide that frivolous appeals may be dismissed,236 
including the Fifth,237 Eighth,238 Tenth,239 Eleventh,240 and D.C. 
Circuits.241 
In Louisiana, however, a state court may not dismiss an appeal 
simply because it is frivolous.242 The Louisiana Supreme Court 
explained in 1956 that “to determine whether an appeal is frivolous or 
is taken for purposes of delay and harassment necessarily requires an 
examination of, and a decision on, the merits of the appeal. It is only 
after the appeal has been heard on its merits” that the court can 
resolve the parties’ contentions.243 For the same reasons, an appellee 
cannot agree to settle a case and yet retain the right to pursue 
sanctions for frivolous appeal.244 
                                                                                                             
 231. STEWART RAPALJE & ROBERT L. LAWRENCE, II DICTIONARY OF 
AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LAW 1147 (1997). 
 232. Martineau, supra note 144, at 864. 
 233. See, e.g., ARK. R. APP. PROC. CIV. 11(c). 
 234. The rule provides: “If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is 
frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and 
reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double 
costs to the appellee.” FED. R. APP. PROC. 38. 
 235. Martineau, supra note 144, at 862. 
 236. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 47(a)(1) authorizes each court of 
appeals to “make and amend rules governing its practice.”  
 237. 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. 
 238. 8TH CIR. R. 47A. 
 239. 10TH CIR. R. 46.5(D). 
 240. 11TH CIR. R. 42-4. 
 241. D.C. CIR. R. 38.  
 242. Francois v. Andry, 930 So. 2d 995, 997 (La. Ct. App. 2006); Jarman v. 
Jarman, 532 So. 2d 484, 486 (La. Ct. App. 1988). 
 243. Kendrick v. Garrene, 91 So. 2d 603, 606 (1956). 
 244. Barry W. Miller, A Prof’l Law Corp. v. Poirier, 580 So. 2d 558, 560–61 
(La. Ct. App. 1991).  
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D. Who Can Be Sanctioned 
As noted above, article 2164 does not state against whom 
sanctions can be assessed. One commentator opined that the full 
burden of sanctions should be on the attorney245 unless the client is 
a “large, sophisticated institution.”246 The federal courts have 
assessed damages solely against the attorney in several cases where 
the appellant had no practical legal knowledge247 and where it was 
“unlikely that the appellant was responsible in any truly meaningful 
way for the meritlessness of the legal arguments presented.”248 
Some courts have assessed sanctions against both client and counsel 
because “attorney and client are in the best position between them to 
determine who caused [the] appeal to be taken,”249 and when 
frivolous arguments are made, counsel “must be held responsible for 
[his] tactical decision.”250 
Despite Louisiana courts’ broad authority, in the past 30 years, 
Louisiana courts have sanctioned only counsel for a frivolous appeal 
just once251 and have sanctioned both client and counsel in only 
three of the 75 cases in which represented parties were sanctioned—
all cases where attorneys behaved very badly.252 In one case, the 
court noted counsel’s “unprofessional and unduly confrontational 
                                                                                                             
 245. Scott A. Martin, Note, Keeping Courts Afloat in a Rising Sea of 
Litigation: An Objective Approach to Imposing Rule 38 Sanctions for Frivolous 
Appeal, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1156, 1175 (2002) (noting that “when an appeal is 
objectively frivolous, the attorney should naturally be the one to bear the burden 
of the monetary sanction”). 
 246. Id. at 1178. 
 247. See, e.g., Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 816–17 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(stating that “blame for this appeal rests upon her attorney, and usually so should 
the burden of any sanctions”); Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 
1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 248. Martin, supra note 245, at 1174–75.  
 249. Roger J. Miner, Professional Responsibility in Appellate Practice: A 
View from the Bench, 19 PACE L. REV. 323, 341 (1999) (quoting United States 
v. Potamkin Cadillac Corp., 689 F.2d 379, 382 (2d Cir. 1982)). See also Hagerty 
v. Succession of Clement, 749 So. 2d 217, 222–23 (5th Cir. 1984); S. Jay Plager 
et al., The Federal Circuit and Frivolous Appeals, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 373, 387 
(2002–2003). 
 250. Dungaree Realty, Inc. v. United States, 30 F.3d 122, 125 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  
 251. In re Succession of Horn, 827 So. 2d 1241, 1247–48 (La. Ct. App. 
2002) (awarding frivolous-appeal sanctions against attorney who appealed from 
trial court but failed to address the issue in brief; the trial-court proceedings 
were “duplicative, reiterating the same claims and repeating the same arguments 
regardless of their having been found without merit by two courts”).  
 252. Davisson v. O’Brien, 104 So. 3d 467 (La. Ct. App. 2012); Mitchell v. 
Brown Builders, 902 So. 2d 1288 (La. Ct. App. 2005); Olympia Roofing Co. v. 
Henican, 534 So. 2d 16 (La. Ct. App. 1988).  
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manner” and “reprehensible tactics and conduct.”253 In the second, 
there was “no basis whatsoever in the record” to support the 
appellant’s claim, and appellant’s counsel failed to offer “a single 
case or statute that support[ed] his argument.”254 In the third, the court 
complained of “rambling briefs” containing “primarily superfluous 
and purely vindictive statements” and “paragraph after paragraph of 
meaningless and irrelevant allegations.”255 
VII. TREATMENT OF PRO SE PARTIES 
A. Pro Se Appellants  
When the appellant and his badly behaving counsel are one and 
the same, i.e., an attorney appearing pro se, the courts are likely to 
impose sanctions. In cases where the pro se appellant is not legally 
trained, however, courts are extremely reluctant to impose sanctions 
under article 2164,256 “even though a small number of such litigants 
expend a disproportionate amount of the court’s time and 
resources.”257 In the federal system, “[m]any courts have historically 
chosen not to impose sanctions on pro se appellants, even after a 
finding of frivolity.”258 Louisiana courts are also reluctant to 
sanction pro se appellants.259 Although pro se litigants are given 
more latitude than represented appellants in Louisiana,260 courts will 
award sanctions in cases of flagrant abuse of the judicial system. 
                                                                                                             
 253. Davisson, 104 So. 3d at 476.  
 254. Mitchell, 902 So. 2d at 1292.  
 255. Olympia Roofing, 534 So. 2d at 17, 19. 
 256. Duke v. Sherwood Acres Apartments, 898 So. 2d 416, 418 (La. Ct. App. 
2004) (“[C]ourts of appeal generally refrain from awarding damages for 
frivolous appeals against pro se litigants.”). 
 257. Bankston v. Alexandria Neurosurgical Clinic, 659 So. 2d 507, 511 (La. 
Ct. App. 1995). 
 258. Meehan Rasch, Not Taking Frivolity Lightly: Circuit Variance in 
Determining Frivolous Appeals Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, 
62 ARK. L. REV. 249, 273 (2009). See, e.g., Lonsdale v. Comm’r, 661 F.2d 71, 
72 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that “[a]ppellants’ contentions are stale ones, long 
settled against them. As such they are frivolous. Bending over backwards, in 
indulgence of appellants’ pro se status, we today forbear the sanctions of Rule 
38 . . . .”). 
 259. See, e.g., Bernard v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov’t, No. 12-1341, 
2013 WL 1437891, at *3 (La. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2013) (declining to award 
penalties against pro se appellants because “as lay people, they did not 
comprehend the consequences of their actions”); Zeno v. Foret, No. 10-330, 
2010 WL 3903782, at *1 (La. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2010) (“Inasmuch as the 
appellant is appearing pro se, we deny any damages for frivolous appeal.”) 
 260. Dowl v. Redi Care Home Health Ass’n, 31 So. 3d 596, 608 (La. Ct. 
App. 2010). 
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For example, in Dowl v. Redi Care Home Health Ass’n, the 
court imposed sanctions against a pro se litigant who appealed 
despite the trial judge thoroughly explaining to him that he had no 
case and would be penalized if he appealed.261 In Bankston v. 
Alexandria Neurosurgical Clinic, the pro se litigant failed to appear 
at trial and then filed repeated appeals of the same issue.262 The 
court awarded sanctions in all three appeals because of the “repeated 
abuse of the judicial system” through “voluminous, repetitive, and 
irrational filings.” 263 And, in Allen v. IMT, Inc., the court sanctioned 
the pro se litigant, finding that she was not serious when she filed a 
late brief that cited no legal authority and asserted specifications of 
error that “were totally without merit either factually or legally.”264 
The rationale for giving more latitude to pro se appellants is 
their lack of legal training.265 That rationale disappears when the pro 
se appellant is a law student or attorney. The courts have sanctioned 
legally trained pro se appellants in at least three cases.266 
B. Pro Se Appellees 
In the one reported Louisiana case seeking article 2164 sanctions 
where the appellee appeared pro se, the court denied sanctions under 
article 2164, apparently under the mistaken belief that the only 
applicable damages were attorney fees. In Miles v. Connick,267 an 
inmate won affirmance of a public-records request suit. He asked for 
statutory attorney fees and frivolous-appeal damages. The court 
denied both requests because “he [was] not entitled to be reimbursed 
for fees that he was not required to pay.”268 
                                                                                                             
 261. Id. at 609. 
 262. Bankston v. Alexandria Neurosurgical Clinic (Bankston III), 659 So. 2d 
507, 511 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Bankston v. Alexandria Neurosurgical Clinic, 583 
So. 2d 1156 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Bankston v. Alexandria Neurosurgical Clinic, 
583 So. 2d 1148 (La. Ct. App. 1991). 
 263. Bankston III, 659 So. 2d at 511. 
 264. Allen v. IMT, Inc., 567 So. 2d 1155, 1159 (La. Ct. App. 1990). 
 265. Dowl, 31 So. 3d at 608. 
 266. Sisk v. Sisk, 971 So. 2d 1215, 1218 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (sanctioning 
former attorney who cited no legal authority in brief, was warned by both the 
trial and appellate courts about accusations against the court, and still made 
“endless defamatory and unsupportable allegations”); Hester v. Hester (Hester 
II), 699 So. 2d 1099, 1102 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that attorney exhibited a 
“continued pattern of harassment and delay” against his ex-wife); State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Callahan, 571 So. 2d 852, 855 (La. Ct. App. 1990) 
(explaining at length that claimed defense of law student/appellant was frivolous 
when at time of trial the appellant was “not wholly unfamiliar with the legal 
system” and was admitted to the bar by the time the appeal was decided).  
 267. 613 So. 2d 1169 (La. Ct. App. 1993). 
 268. Id. at 1172. 
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VIII. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Attorneys who represent appellants are held to a higher 
standard than non-attorney pro se appellants, of course, because 
attorneys are subject to rules of ethics and professionalism.  
The first ethical issue an appellate attorney faces is whether to 
bring the appeal. The attorney “must assess whether a good-faith 
argument . . . exist[s] to support the client’s claim.”269 Louisiana 
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 prohibits asserting or defending a 
claim “unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not 
frivolous.”270 Thus, “[i]f the legal question is not genuinely 
arguable, the case should not be [appealed].”271 
In order to make that determination, the attorney must identify 
the client’s objective in taking the appeal. If that objective is to 
delay or harass, the appeal may violate Louisiana Rule of 
Professional Conduct 3.2, which provides: “A lawyer shall make 
reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests 
of the client.”272 
The attorney has an obligation to inform his client if the appeal 
is frivolous, as he must advise his client when adverse consequences 
can result from a proposed course of action.273 If the client’s 
objective in appealing is improper, the attorney must withdraw.274 
If an attorney decides to take an appeal, knowing he has at least 
one meritorious issue, he then faces the ethical dilemma of whether 
to also include other not-so-meritorious issues. After all, a Louisiana 
appellant, unlike a federal appellant,275 will not be sanctioned “when 
partially frivolous grounds are urged on appeal if the appellant is 
accorded at least part of the relief requested based on a meritorious 
                                                                                                             
 269. MELISSA H. WERESH, LEGAL WRITING: ETHICAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 130 (2d ed. 2009). See also J. Michael Medina, Ethical 
Concerns in Civil Appellate Advocacy, 43 SW. L.J. 677, 684 (1989). 
 270. LA. R. PROF. CONDUCT, in LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37, ch. 4 app., art. 
XVI, R. 3.1 (2013) [hereinafter LA. R. PROF. CONDUCT].  
 271. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Arguing the Law: The Advocate’s Duty and 
Opportunity, 16 GA. L. REV. 821, 829 (1982).  
 272. LA. R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.2. See also Medina, supra note 269, at 684. 
 273. See Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 F. Supp. 1283, 1289–
90 (E.D. La. 1973), aff’d, 500 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1974) (quoting Ramp v. St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 239 (La. 1972)). 
 274. Medina, supra note 269, at 680; Glenn K. Seidenfeld, Professional 
Responsibility Before Reviewing Courts, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 264, 268 (1976). In 
discussing attorneys’ obligations in criminal appeals, the United States Supreme 
Court stated that an attorney is “under an ethical obligation to refuse to 
prosecute a frivolous appeal.” McCoy v. Ct. App. Wisc., 486 U.S. 429, 436 
(1988). 
 275. See Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1203 (7th Cir. 1987); 
Lopez, supra note 156, at 148. 
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ground.”276 The attorney should keep in mind that although he might 
not be sanctioned under article 2164, he is acting irresponsibly by 
wasting time that the court could be spending on meritorious 
issues.277 Moreover, such conduct contravenes the Louisiana Code of 
Professionalism, which provides in pertinent part: “I will not . . . 
utilize any course of conduct for the purpose of undue delay or 
harassment of any other counsel or party.”278 
When the attorney does not withdraw and proceeds with an 
appeal intended to delay or harass, he violates several Louisiana 
Rules of Professional Conduct and risks official disciplinary 
proceedings. Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(a) states: “In 
representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no 
substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third 
person.”279 Rules 8.4(a) and (d) more generally proscribe 
unprofessional conduct. Rule 8.4(a) provides: “It is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) Violate or attempt to violate the 
Rules of Professional Conduct . . . ;”280 and Rule 8.4(d) prohibits 
engaging “in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.”281 
Attorneys file frivolous appeals for myriad reasons, which 
generally fall into four categories: greed, anxiety, ineptness, and 
excessive zeal. Greedy attorneys appeal to increase their fees,282 to 
profit from favorable interest rates,283 or to “harry [the opponent] 
into compromise.”284 Anxious attorneys appeal to keep clients they 
                                                                                                             
 276. Thibodeau v. Mayor of Morgan City, 619 So. 2d 595, 608 (La. Ct. 
App.), rev’d on other grounds, 629 So. 2d 362 (La. 1993). See also Starwood v. 
Taylor, 434 So. 2d 1236, 1238 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Galloway v. Minckler, 63 
So. 2d 891, 892 (La. Ct. App. 1953). 
 277. See Miner, supra note 249, at 325–26.  
 278. Code of Professionalism, 62 LA. B.J. 307 (2015).  
 279. LA. R. PROF. CONDUCT 4.4(a). 
 280. LA. R. PROF. CONDUCT 8.4(a). 
 281.  LA. R. PROF. CONDUCT 8.4(d). 
 282. See Miner, supra note 249, at 326; Lopez, supra note 156, at 150 
(“[S]ome frivolous appeals are brought merely ‘to line a lawyer’s pocket.’”). 
 283. Miner, supra note 249, at 326. In Bankers Trust Co. v. Publicker 
Industries Inc., 641 F.2d 1361, 1367–68 (2d Cir. 1981), the court noted that a 
judicial interest rate lower than the market rate encouraged appeals solely for 
delay. The value of the delay to the appellate ultimately depends on the extent of 
the delay; the further behind an appellate court’s docket is, the more incentive an 
appellant has to appeal. Oberman, supra note 5, at 1062 n.50. 
 284. Penalties for Frivolous Appeals, supra note 213, at 117. “Frivolous 
appeals are easy to file but often difficult and expensive to defend.” Mark R. 
Kravitz, Unpleasant Duties: Imposing Sanctions for Frivolous Appeals, 4 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 335, 342 (2002). While on the First Circuit, Justice Breyer 
described “undesirable types of behavior” by both plaintiffs and defendants who 
appeal meritless cases seeking compromises. Natasha, Inc. v. Evita Marine 
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fear will find another attorney to file the appeal or worry that they 
will be sued for malpractice if they do not appeal.285 Inept attorneys 
fail to properly research286 or “blindly follow[] their clients’ 
wishes.”287 Overzealous attorneys want to show their clients “they 
are willing to fight to the end”;288 some become obsessed and use 
appeals to carry on a vendetta against their opponents.289 
Under Louisiana’s standards, anxious, inept, overzealous, and 
even greedy attorneys are rarely sanctioned for filing frivolous 
                                                                                                             
 
Charters, Inc., 763 F.2d 468, 471 (1985). Some unscrupulous plaintiffs appeal 
“strike suits” that “have no legal merit but which a plaintiff hopes the defendant 
will settle by paying the plaintiff something less than it would cost to defend the 
suit,” while some defendants who owe money may not pay it or may offer to pay 
less in the belief that “the costs of litigation will make it uneconomic for the 
plaintiff to pursue collection of the full amount owed.” Id. at 471–72 (citing 
Note, Extortionate Corporate Litigation: The Strike Suit, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 
1308 (1934); Arthur Allen Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite—The Dynamics of 
Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1970)). 
 285. Anastasia Parham Campbell, Student Commentary, Frivolous Civil 
Appeals: How to Avoid Sanctions, 25 J. LEGAL PROF. 135, 135 (2001); Miner, 
supra note 249, at 326. 
 286. See, e.g., Natasha, 763 F.2d at 472. Justice Breyer noted that while an 
“appeal’s frivolity may not be intuitively clear to one familiar with the field,” 
the appeal would be found frivolous when “a minimal amount of research, even 
a cursory reading of the relevant treatises and case law, should have revealed to 
the appellant” that a legal position was unsound. Id. As Professor Lopez noted, 
such a mistake may indicate ineptness, but “can reflect an empty head as easily 
as an impure heart.” Lopez, supra note 156, at 107. See also Hilmon Co. (V.I.) 
Inc. v. Hyatt Int’l, 899 F.2d 250, 254 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that “attorneys 
have an affirmative obligation to research the law and to determine if a claim on 
appeal is utterly without merit and may be deemed frivolous”). 
 287. Campbell, supra note 285, at 135.  
 288. Miner, supra note 249, at 326. As the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit noted, “the desire to keep business is an inevitable part 
of the practice of law. When lawyers yield to the temptation to file baseless 
pleadings to appease clients, however, they must understand that their 
adversary’s fees become a cost of their business.” In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 
446 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 289. See, e.g., Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 103 F.3d 125 
(5th Cir. 1996); Platt v. Jack Cooper Transp., Co., 959 F.2d 91, 96 (8th Cir. 
1992). One Louisiana judge, however, disagreed that overzealousness should be 
penalized. In Gulf Coast Bank v. Robino, 634 So. 2d 1190 (La. Ct. App. 1993), 
the trial court imposed sanctions on Robino for a frivolous pleading “filed for 
both harassment and dilatory purposes.” Id. at 1193. Robino appealed the 
sanctions and was assessed additional penalties on appeal. Judge John Saunders 
dissented from the imposition of sanctions, stating, “The true measure of any 
profession is the vigor and zeal given by its members to the interest of those 
they serve. An overzealous bar poses no threat to the ends of justice. One 
immobilized by timidity is, in my mind, a very real threat to those ends.” Id. at 
1196 (Saunders, J., dissenting). 
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appeals, but in a recent case the Louisiana Supreme Court took 
disciplinary action against an attorney who “engaged in a pattern 
and practice of filing repetitive, harassing, burdensome, and 
frivolous lawsuits, appeals, and writs.”290 In that case, an attorney 
was publicly reprimanded for violating Rules 3.1, 4.4(a), 8.4(a), and 
8.4(d).291 The Rules of Professional Conduct were established to 
maintain the integrity of the legal profession and public confidence in 
the profession,292 and it is appropriate that they be applied to attorneys 
who undermine that integrity and destroy public confidence in the 
profession. 
IX. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Louisiana’s frivolous-appeal-sanction scheme is ineffective due 
to its highly subjective standards and the courts’ unwillingness to 
impose sanctions. Louisiana appellate judges complain about their 
crowded dockets, yet they do little to discourage time-consuming 
frivolous appeals. When, on average, fewer than three appeals are 
found frivolous each year, and those violators are punished with 
paltry monetary penalties, attorneys are not deterred from wasting 
the courts’ time with meritless claims. As Judge Morris Lottinger 
stated in Rogers v. D’Aubin: “The failure to award frivolous appeal 
damages sends forth a message to all appellees to not waste the time 
and effort seeking frivolous appeal damages, because they are not to 
be awarded.”293 Thus, one recommendation is that, when 
appropriate, Louisiana courts stop being so timid about imposing 
sanctions and punish appellants and their counsel for filing frivolous 
appeals.294 
                                                                                                             
 290. In re Bandaries, 156 So. 3d 1152, 1156–57 (La. 2014). In another case, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court referred attorney/appellant Hester to the Louisiana 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel “for investigation and appropriate action” after his 
ex-wife complained that in seven years he had filed 12 appeals before the 
intermediate appellate court and six writ applications to the Louisiana Supreme 
Court. Hester v. Hester, 756 So. 2d 314, 315 (La. 2000).  
 291. Bandaries, 156 So. 3d at 1160–61. 
 292. See Andrew D. Pugh, The Antidiscrimination Amendment to Rule 8.4 of 
the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 211, 
214–15 (1993). 
 293. 498 So. 2d 253, 257 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (Lottinger, J., dissenting). 
Judge Lottinger also authored the majority opinion but filed a separate opinion 
indicating his dissent at the majority’s refusal to award damages for frivolous 
appeal.  
 294. One appellate practitioner has suggested that appellate courts have 
become “the victims of their own timidity” when they refuse to impose 
sanctions or impose penalties that are so small they have no deterrent effect. 
Kravitz, supra note 284, at 348. 
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Another recommendation is that those penalties be more than a 
mere slap on the wrist. As the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit stated: “The best way to control unjustified 
tactics in litigation is to ensure that those who create costs also 
bear them.”295 A typical “modest” award of $1,000 is unlikely to 
fully compensate an appellee who must pay an attorney to file an 
answer to appeal, brief the case, and appear at oral argument. 
Imposing sanctions that fully cover the cost of the appellee’s 
attorney fees would have much more of a deterrent effect. 
The court refused to award sanctions in Rogers because it did 
not want to “penalize an appellant for his counsel’s erroneous 
interpretation of the law.”296 Penalizing the client is not much of a 
deterrent to an attorney and will not stop the attorney from 
continuing to file frivolous appeals in other cases.297 However, 
nothing in article 2164 prohibits the court from imposing sanctions 
directly against counsel, rather than the appellant. Thus, an 
additional recommendation is that Louisiana courts penalize the 
attorneys who are responsible for bringing the frivolous appeals, 
starting with cases involving briefs with no authority cited and 
counsel who fail to appear at oral argument. If the courts are 
reluctant to assess sanctions solely against the attorney, they may 
assess sanctions jointly against the attorney and the client as 
“attorney and client are in the best position between them to 
determine who caused [a frivolous] appeal to be taken.”298 
One reason intermediate appellate courts refuse to award 
sanctions is that they do not like to be reversed, and the Louisiana 
Supreme Court is not known for upholding sanctions. The highly 
subjective standard applied by the Louisiana Supreme Court gives 
unethical or inept attorneys a license to fritter away the courts’ 
time, leaving less time for the issues that need deep analysis. As 
one commentator noted: “A high threshold sanctions scheme that 
requires proof of subjective bad faith as a prerequisite to sanctions 
is the least effective kind of sanctions scheme in deterring 
litigation abuse.”299 A fourth suggestion is that when the Supreme 
Court addresses the issue again, it reject the Parker and Hampton 
                                                                                                             
 295. In re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 1985).  
 296. Rogers, 498 So. 2d at 257. 
 297. See Martin, supra note 245, at 1181; Coughlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 
806, 817 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Hagerty v. Succession of Clement, 749 F.2d 
217, 222 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
 298. United States v. Potamkin Cadillac Corp., 689 F.2d 379, 382 (2d Cir. 
1982). 
 299. Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to “Frivolous” 
Litigation: A Critical Review of Rule 11 and State Sanction Provisions, 21 PEPP. 
L. REV. 1067, 1141 (1994). 
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test and instead adopt an objective test—at the time the appeal was 
taken, would a reasonable attorney have believed that the 
judgment should be reversed—rather than the current subjective 
test—whether the appellant, at the time he appealed, believe the 
judgment should be reversed.300 An objective test would discourage 
attorneys from filing appeals as “a knee-jerk-reaction to every 
unfavorable ruling”301 and encourage more careful research and 
analysis.302 An exception could be made for pro se appellants who 
lack legal training.303 
A final recommendation is that the Louisiana Legislature 
ameliorate some of the procedural problems by amending the Code 
of Civil Procedure to allow frivolous-appeal sanctions to be 
requested by motion filed within a short period of time after the 
appellant’s brief is filed and to specifically allow frivolous-appeal 
sanctions when appeals are dismissed as abandoned. The current 
procedure, which requires the request to be made before the 
appellant’s brief is filed, leaves the appellee trying to guess the 
grounds for the appeal. It also gives the appellant a significant 
advantage under the current subjective standard, as it allows the 
appellant to defeat the request for sanctions by making a claim of 
sincerity in the brief. 
The task of the appellate courts is to “ensure that justice is 
carried out.”304 Appellate courts should be willing “to compensate 
appellees who are forced to defend judgments awarded them in the 
trial court from appeals that are wholly without merit, and to 
‘preserve the appellate court calendar for cases worthy of 
consideration.’”305 Sanctioning frivolous appeals will allow 
Louisiana appellate courts to ensure that justice is carried out by 
giving them more time to carefully consider meritorious appeals, 
reimbursing appellees for the time and money lost dealing with 
frivolous appeals, and punishing attorneys who flout ethical rules 
established to maintain the integrity of the profession. 
                                                                                                             
 300. See Lopez, supra note 156, at 74; Martineau, supra note 144, at 854–55; 
Rasch, supra note 258, at 275 (describing the reasonable-attorney standard as a 
“sensible benchmark”). 
 301. Simon & Flynn, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 513 F.2d 832, 833 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 302. See Martineau, supra note 144, at 855–56.  
 303. A federal court applied the standard that a pro se appeal was frivolous 
when a reasonable, non-legally trained person should have known “that his 
cause was indeed hopeless.” Bacon v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps. 
Council, 795 F.2d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 304. LaDonte A. Murphy, Comment, Access to Appellate Review: Writs, 
Appeals, and Interlocutory Judgments, 34 S.U. L. REV. 27, 28 (2007).  
 305. Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Hilmon Co. 
(V.I.) Inc. v. Hyatt Int’l, 899 F.2d 250, 251 (3d Cir. 1990)). 

